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Introduction
Communicology is the science of communication. It is a discipline which works with appreciation
for and in alignment with both social and natural science, with two important differences: (1)
communicology seeks understanding over knowledge, and (2) communicology seeks not to overcome
the unknown, but instead to reconnect with or re-enter the uncertainty of that preverbal, preconceptual
space in which a human being encounters the unmitigated other (the world), and communication
begins. Rather than moving always out and away from the semi-knowable toward more knowledge,
communicology moves bi-directionally, out from and also back into the semi-knowable source of bodily
experience.
As a relatively young discipline, communicology is not yet an established area of study within
most mainstream academic communication programs. I argue that it should be. The discipline, drawing
heavily from philosophy, communication theory and logic, involves a level of complexity which may turn
uninitiated students and scholars away. However, within this complexity one finds a core of elegant
simplicity. Communicology is a useful discovery tool with capacity to do immense good. In an effort to
demonstrate this capacity and make a case for sharing the discipline more widely, I have formulated two
research questions which guide the direction of this thesis and the research therein. They are:
1. Can communicology be presented through university coursework in a way that is both accurate
and accessible, contrary to some scholarly views suggesting that concepts related to
communicology might be more effective if delivered indirectly and under other focus areas?
2. What case can be made regarding the need for a fourth step in addition to the three existing
steps that make up the structured discovery process put forward as the semiotic
phenomenological method? How would a fourth step develop in terms of name, function and
praxis?
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I will structure Part 1 of this thesis around the leading definition of communicology, written and
developed by the discipline’s founder and leading scholar, Richard L. Lanigan. The definition itself is
brilliantly condensed, and demands from a reader advanced understanding of multiple challenging
concepts. The explication in Part 1 is meant to open and explore the definition, creating multiple points
of access and discussion for students. This exploration will serve as an instructor's companion to a
proposed course syllabus which appears as the final section of this work.
In Part 2, I propose that a fourth step may already exist within communicology’s triadic
methodological framework, and make a case for the identification and clarification of this step. My
motivation for such a proposal is rooted in two areas. First, Lanigan is currently exploring the possibility
of a fourth research step or a fourth realm of analysis. I add my own research and perspective to this
effort. Second, Lanigan’s triadic research methodology for communicology corresponds with Charles
Sanders Peirce’s triadic semiotic and ontological systems, which emerged from and are situated within a
Western scholarly viewpoint. My proposed fourth step examines materiality, or Peirce’s realm of
“secondness” in terms of its deeply nuanced subtlety. My goal is to legitimize non-dominant discovery
methods and non-Western communication-oriented ontologies, allowing other perspectives to shine
through more prominently. This for the purpose of addressing widespread and deep-seated cultural and
societal problems that persist despite (or perhaps because of) various human interventions over many
years. Climate change presents an existential threat to all life. Political divisiveness fractures
communities. People in the United States are dying from suicide and drug overdoses at alarming rates. A
global economic equality gap continues to widen, and social conditions are fragile worldwide in the
wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. In other words, so many people are disconnected, ill-at-ease, alienated
from the experience of their own lives. People who are confused or alienated are likely to build
technologies, systems and societies that reproduce and amplify disconnection. This cycle is perpetuated
as long as communication is viewed and understood with a natural attitude. In other words, we often
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solve our problems with more problems; treat poison with more poison, etc. because communication—
that thing which generates discourse and culture—is poorly understood.
Communicology is a critical-interpretive tool that, when understood and skillfully employed, has
the capacity for what C.S. Peirce called “harmonious disturbance.” It disrupts and suspends the natural
attitude, opening into new vistas of possibility regarding (a) the communicative roots or sources of
socio-cultural problems; and (b) innovative communication-oriented paths forward. Those paths which
may have been previously obscured are revealed through the methodological process of semiotic
phenomenology, the research tool associated with the discipline of communicology.
The following explication allows for exploration and understanding regarding what
communicology is. It begins with the following definition, featured on the International Communicology
Institute web page at communicology.org:
Communicology is the science of human communication. One of the Human Science
disciplines, it uses the logic-based research methods of semiotics and phenomenology to
explicate human consciousness and behavioral embodiment as discourse within global
culture... (emphasis added).
In part I, each term/concept marked in boldface within the definition will be addressed under
the corresponding subhead, and in the order in which Lanigan presents them, in a comprehensive
exploration of the theory behind communicology. All nine topic areas interconnect with one another,
and all contribute to a coherent understanding of the theoretical concepts of semiotic phenomenology
in general. Topics are covered in the following sections:
1. Communicology and communication
2. The science of human communication
3. Human Science
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4. Communicology and logic
5. Semiotic phenomenology
6. Human consciousness
7. Embodiment
8. Discourse
9. Culture

Part I. Explication
1. Communicology rather than communication?
The discipline of communicology studies the full range of human communication, similar to the
way biology studies living organisms or anthropology studies human culture. The word communicology
stems from the Latin prefix communis (that which is held in common and created/constructed in
common), and the suffix ology (specifying logic) (Catt, Smith & Klyukanov, 2018). Communicology
examines communication as the creative generation and outpouring of meanings that humans throw
onto the worlds they inhabit, and the ways in which they reinforce those worlds socially and culturally.
The word communication is often defined in simplified terms as an expressive skill. People said
to have “good communication skills” are considered competent speakers, writers, negotiators, listeners,
etc. Expressive skills are usually a focus of academic “communication studies” programs, which train
students in organizational communication, journalism, social media, public relations, etc.--specific
industry or job-related subsets which are useful and valuable in their own right, but fail to address the
vastness of the inter-looping (Borden, 2017) systems of communication that drive human experience,
meaning, and relationship to the other in general.
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Dominant cultural and academic attitudes tend to view communication in terms of information
theory, or the transmission of messages as objects between a sender and a receiver. Communicology, by
contrast, does not objectify the message, suggesting instead that the meaning of any message is cocreated by both sender and receiver in a dynamic, generative process (Lanigan, 2019). Put simply
communication is not just a way to convey meaning. Communication creates meaning (Fiske, 1990). This
is true whether one refers to creating the meaning of a word or a world.
2. The science of communication.
Communication at its minimum is an ecosystem, according to Lanigan (1988), in the sense that
“communication is the name for the reversible relationship between an organism (person) and its
environment (lived-world), both of which exist in a mutual context or Environment (p. 11). The organism
in this sense can also be conceived as a group or society. This relationship between organism and world
is reversible in the sense that each flows into the other. The idea that both organism and environment
exist within a “mutual context” or capital-E “Environment” suggests that communication unfolds
between an organism and its personal, subjective “lived world”. Each of these “lived worlds” exists
within a larger ecosystem or Environment that (a) contains the interconnected lived worlds of many
individuals, and (b) serves as the context or environment or stage where organisms and their lived
worlds come into being and play out.
Such a view extends the concept of communication beyond a “verbal, explicit and intentional
transmission of messages alone...” to include "...all those processes by which people influence one
another” (Ruesch, 1968, p. 5-6). Human communication also includes processes and practices by which
people (individuals and groups) influence and are influenced by the world and other beings as well.
A communicative relationship between an organism and its environment unfolds via multiple
levels or types of practice ranging from internal experience and dialogue within one’s own mind/body to
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the relationship between environment and large group/culture. Lanigan (1988) suggests that the most
advanced level of this reversible relationship connecting person and world through creative generation
of meaning is language. Language is as immersive and commonplace as air—it sustains our engagement
with and understanding of the world. A spider quite naturally and apparently without much
contemplation weaves a complex, patterned web as a way of relating to its environment—a necessity
for survival. We humans weave complex patterns of meanings with language.
Language, perception, thinking, action: all these give shape or body to the elusive experience of
meaning. All of these bring meaning into being through concepts, practices and material artifacts, and
all are communication.
In their major work titled “Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry,” Ruesch (a
psychiatrist) and Bateson (an anthropologist, social scientist and semiotician) proposed a theory
regarding a science of human communication. The authors recognized that human experience tends to
be dissected and broken into categories based on part and whole within the context of relationships: “a
cell and the surrounding tissue” for example, or “one organ within an organism; an individual within the
family group; a family within the community; and ultimately, perhaps, the community within the
framework of the nation; and the nation within the (world)” (Ruesch & Bateson, 1968, p. 4). Social and
physical scientists view and examine each of these interconnected part-whole systems in isolation from
the others. For example, biology studies human physiological perception by perhaps examining optic or
olfactory systems in the body; psychology studies the way humans behave and function in interpersonal
relationships; and anthropology studies the development and structure of human culture. Such
differentiation can be necessary and beneficial in early stages of study, but the same separations
eventually become obstructions to understanding the way communication functions on a larger scale
(Ruesch & Bateson, 1968). From the authors’ perspective, these multiple categories of analysis are all
living parts of the same whole. Ruesch and Bateson, therefore, proposed a unified theory with the
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capacity to encompass both part and whole. The proposed discipline—perhaps the only one capable of
addressing and analyzing all the varied, interconnected realms of human life and experience at all levels
—is communication.
Ruesch and Bateson’s Theory of Human Communication proposes four distinct yet
interconnected and interdependent network communication levels on which human communication
occurs: intrapersonal, interpersonal, group and cultural levels. Each of these network levels contains
insight or information regarding the others, given that they are all inter-looping and interdependent.
From within this network-level view of communication, a researcher might magnify and focus on any
one of these levels in a given analysis, without ever coming untethered from the other three, or from
the dynamic living processes that move them.
The intrapersonal level involves individuals’ internal experience—encounters with the physical
world and with their own minds and bodies as part of the world. This level involves sense organs, bodily
perceptions, thought expressions, internal dialogue, etc. “At the intrapersonal level, the focus of the
observer is limited by the self, and the various functions of communication are found within the self”
(Ruesch & Bateson, 1968, p. 274).
The interpersonal level involves interaction between two people and focuses on an individual’s
encounter with an other. At this network level, shared reality unfolds. Researchers are “interested to
inquire into the ways an observer perceives the world rather than how this world really is, because the
only method we possess to infer the existence of the real world is to compare one observer’s views with
the views of other observers” (Ruesch & Bateson, 1968, p. 273).
The group level involves multiple individuals, and includes communication either from one
individual or small group of individuals speaking to the many, or the many speaking to the one (perhaps
through a designated representative). The group network level may involve any group, including a
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family, business or organization, political group, a theater company, a classroom including students and
teacher, etc. (Ruesch & Bateson, 1968).
Finally, the cultural level involves large-scale inter-group communication. Unlike the previous
three levels, which are explicitly perceived and recognized by individual participants, people do not
generally recognize the influence of culture in their lives, as culture operates pre-consciously, and
appears as common sense or natural.
When participating in a cultural network, people are in many cases unaware of being the
receivers or senders of messages. Rather the message seems to be an unstated description of
their way of living. They attribute it to no human origin, but they themselves transmit the
message to others by living in accordance with its content, which they may regard as ‘human
nature’” (Ruesch & Bateson, 1968, p. 282).
Messages sent and received at the cultural level may include “messages about language and linguistic
systems”, “ethical premises”, and theories about how human beings relate to the universe and other
people (Ruesch & Bateson, 1968, p. 282).
Communication at the intrapersonal network level is quite malleable and can be changed
relatively easily. We have the capacity to change our minds according to what we experience around us.
As communication moves up through the levels, however, it becomes increasingly rigid or sedimented—
a term Merleau-Ponty coined to describe the process by which “we count upon the things that are there
and that are given as a whole, without our having to repeat their synthesis at each moment” (Landes &
Merleau-Ponty, 2014, p. 131). In other words, through sedimentation, we acquire and store “worlds of
thought” regarding our bodily position and habitual movement in various environments which allow us
to act semi-automatically without high levels of focus or concentration (Landes & Merleau-Ponty, 2014
& Webber, 2018). By the time messages reach the cultural level, they have reified into the natural
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attitude—a set of ideologies and beliefs about the way things are (Lanigan, 2016). Though these levels
are positioned as a hierarchy, with the intrapersonal level on the bottom and cultural level on the top, it
is important to note that the cultural level feeds prominently into the intrapersonal level, determining to
some degree what and how an individual perceives and thinks about the world. Likewise, each individual
who reinforces cultural messaging, through thought and behavior, feeds back into the cultural network
level. Therefore, this hierarchy can also be conceived as a loop or a cycle.
3. Human science
Simply put, human science studies people or their actions, in contrast with the natural or
physical sciences, which study objects. Lanigan offers a more nuanced description, calling human
science “the scientific methodology and subject matter of those states of consciousness and behaviors
that we call human, as opposed to the objects studied by the physical sciences whose rubric is human
sensation of those objects” (Lanigan, 2010, p. 102). This rubric of human sensation, which mediates all
contact between humans and the objects they study, presents an often-overlooked problem within the
physical sciences: humans can only study or know an object according to their subjective sensed
experience of that object (seeing, touching, hearing, attitudes, beliefs, etc). Physical science tends to
overlook or disregard the veil of human sensory processing that lies between a researcher and an
object, while human science fully embraces it as one of the primary creative elements of the
communicative process.
Foucault (1970) suggests the human sciences did not develop according to the same
epistemological process that produced philosophy, quantitative natural science, and quantitative social
sciences, but rather emerged because of them, in the space that exists between them. In other words,
the more data, knowledge and collective wisdom humans acquired, the more starkly they saw
themselves against the backdrop of the world, experiencing themselves as observers of the world.
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Imagine that each of the three disciplines—natural science, social science and philosophy—
occupies one point or angle of a triangle, and that the human sciences exist because an empty space
appears between those three points, within the lines of the triangle. Existing there in between, the
human sciences flow into all three points of the triangle. In this way, they are interdisciplinary
(coordinating coherent links between multiple different disciplines) or transdisciplinary (uniting multiple
different disciplines in a new context which transcends traditional boundaries). The quality of occupying
the interstices allows the human sciences access to the territory of each specific point on the triangle,
while the points themselves remain separated from one another.
Foucault’s archaeology of human knowledge (1970) suggests even more specifically that the
sciences emerged from within a tension between genesis and mathesis. Genesis refers to “the marks
progressively imprinted in the mind by the resemblances between things and the retrospective action of
the imagination,” while mathesis refers to the “utilization of the symbols of possible operations upon
identities and differences” (p. 73). In simplified terms, on the genesis end of the knowledge spectrum,
humans perceived resemblances between things they could sense, and used imagination to establish
connections between those things (abductive logic—see Section 4.4). On the mathesis end of the
knowledge spectrum, humans developed operations to calculate and measure differences between
sensed objects, and to put those things in some sort of order (computation—see Section 4.3). Between
these two poles lies taxinomia, which “resides within (mathesis) and is distinguished from it; for it too is
a science of order—a qualitative mathesis.” Here Foucault reveals that the origins of science—
mathesis—included a key qualitative element necessary for the pursuit of knowledge and
understanding, or “the science of truth” (p. 74).
Mathematics is one set or style of operations which emerged from the inclusive and unitary
body of knowing that is mathesis (Foucault, 1970). Foucault suggests that modern quantitative scientific
methods did not become dominant according to new advances in the capacity of mathematics to
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discover truth, but rather in response to a retreat of mathesis as a unitary field. (Foucault, 1970). Slowly,
as methods of human thought and analysis changed shape and course, the unity between qualitative
and quantitative thinking that was mathesis began to disappear. Foucault (1970) suggests that
By disappearing, (mathesis) left nature and the entire field of empiricities free for an application,
limited and controlled moment by moment, of mathematics; for do not the first great advances
of mathematical physics, the first massive utilizations of the calculation of probabilities, date
from the time when the attempt at an immediate constitution of a general science of nonquantifiable orders was abandoned (p. 350).
There is little doubt that atrophy of the qualitative domain allowed for major advances in
knowledge in physical sciences like physics and astronomy. Such dramatic success affirmed to scientific
practitioners that quantitative methods for analysis were superior for arriving at knowledge. However,
in areas like biology or psychology, quantitative measurements alone proved incomplete. After all,
seminal works of thinkers like Darwin and Freud would have been impossible without qualitative
research and insight. Foucault claims that the disappearance of mathesis and subsequent flourishing of
quantitative mathematics actually created space for the unique field of biology, in part by
demonstrating what mathematics could not do (Foucault, 1970). The human sciences emerged in the
same way: “it was the retreat of the mathesis, and not the advance of mathematics, that made it
possible for man to constitute himself as an object of knowledge” (Foucault, 1970, p. 350). As qualitative
scientific explorations of human connection to and experience of the physical world dwindled and
disappeared, humans were extracted from that world and placed into an interstice where they became
observers of objects and objective reality, disconnected from the living systems of the world. That state
of disconnection is bereft of meaning. Thus, the human sciences are those which study meaning or put
meaning back into human experience.
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4. Communicology and Logic
Communicology, with its methodology of semiotic phenomenology (see Section 5.3), studies
territories of understanding which, due to their non-quantifiable, non-binary qualities, are often
neglected in the physical and social sciences. Communicology approaches these territories through
qualitative analysis. This is no indication, however, that communicology neglects reason. On the
contrary, the human science discipline of communicology is conducted according to specific and
rigorous standards of logic—that ancient and time-tested system underlying “the nature of reasoning
and the rules for correct or right thinking” (Lanigan, 1988, p. 21). Logic composes the foundations of
philosophy, human science and natural/physical science.
In order to see how types of logic operate within different forms of scientific inquiry, one must
briefly examine the history of metatheory and methodology in the philosophy of science (Lanigan,
1988). In other words, one must consider how human theories and methods for understanding the
world developed over time. Modern science is not something that has always existed. Both the physical
and human sciences were developed by humans according to logic as ways of knowing the world.
Examination of this logic begins with a differentiation between two ancient concepts, preserved
and expressed today in the form of Latin phrases, both of which are translated from the original Greek.
These concepts reveal the roots of two necessary and equally relevant human pursuits: understanding v.
knowledge (Lanigan, 1987).
Quod erat demonstrandum (Q.E.D.) translates to “which was to be demonstrated” (Lanigan,
1988). The acronym Q.E.D. was historically written following the completion of mathematical proofs,
indicating that a student or mathematician had demonstrated (or proven) that which was already the
case (Fawcett, 1956). To demonstrate what is involves the reinforcement of established rules within a
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field of limited possibility. Q.E.D. relates to the process of ending, sealing or closing a unit of knowledge
which, having been proven, becomes subject to reification.
Quod erat inveniendum (Q.E.I.) translates to “which was to be found out” (Lanigan, 1988, 1994).
The idea that something can potentially be found out indicates both possibility and uncertainty, and
suggests exploring a field where anything could happen—a field of unpredictability and possibility.
Q.E.I. is not meant to follow a statement of immutable knowledge like a mathematical proof, but
instead relates to the process of opening, connecting and always beginning. Smith (2018) writes that
Such an end (as Q.E.I.) does not establish identity once and for all, or knowing with certainty...
but remains subject to refinement and elaboration...that involves conversation, argumentation
and dialogical engagement—reasoning, feeling, valuing, learning communicatively...and
remaining open to the unexpected no matter how much it may displace, throw one out of
context, or disrupt an otherwise elegant design (Smith, 2018, p. 28).
Very different worlds will be constructed depending upon which meta-theoretical framework domnates.
Q.E.D is always closing and delimiting along a linear path toward a final end—the edge of the world, so
to speak. Q.E.D. is final, and nothing lies beyond it. By contrast, Q.E.I. is always opening along an everforking path which has no conceivable end. Q.E.I. is always beginning, and something always lies beyond
the next bend. It is important to understand and differentiate between these two frameworks, as what
can exist and be known in one cannot necessarily exist and be known in another. In a framework where
Western Eurocentric Q.E.D-based views dominate, emergent cultures are in many ways unable to know
or connect with a view of the world that is oriented toward opening, beginning or turning along a
cyclical route. Communicology is a tool which navigates both frameworks by looking not just at data, as
is the common practice in the physical sciences, but at two other areas as well: capta and acta.
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4.1 Data, Capta, Acta
The Q.E.I. model is equipped to explore both quantifiable and non-quantifiable areas of study,
whereas the Q.E.D. model relies upon measurable data to generate “proof.” Data is a word often
assumed to be synonymous with information or facts, however, its actual meaning is more nuanced. The
Latin word data means “what are given,” referring to objective facts which can be observed and
measured.
Consider, by contrast, the Latin word capta, which means “what are taken.” In the context of
Q.E.I., capta represent that which a researcher (or any human being, for that matter) chooses to take up
from a field of innumerable possibilities. Discourse and action are not comprised of data, according to
Smith (2018), or pre-fabricated facts “sitting ready for plucking from the world” (p. 28). Rather, Smith
describes discourse and action as “taken and constructed, worked through and lived, presented
situationally...and fallibly as capta” (p. 28).
That which researchers often presume to be objective factual data are actually sense
experiences filtered through and translated by the human body and mind, and shaped according to
cultural presuppositions. The researcher chooses and constructs data preconsciously, using signs to
create what appears to be the beginning or ground-level of awareness (see Section 5.1). Data-focused
study requires that a researcher take for granted that the perceived data is as it appears.
Consider, for example, the typical social science survey. Participant answers to survey questions
may or may not be true, but they are the answers given to the researcher. These answers, or that which
is given, become the data that the researcher uses to calculate truths and predictions. All truths
emerging from the study presuppose that the data is true, even though respondents had the
opportunity to withhold the truth, and may have done so for myriad reasons.
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Such insight is not intended to argue against the value of data or the Q.E.D. model, but to reveal
the existence of a deeper level of human experience and analysis—the level of unmitigated human
experience from which data emerges. It opens itself to study through communicology.
Lanigan (1988) describes a third Latin term, acta, which serves as a “unifying force” between
data and capta, and also addresses the historical bifurcation of the two. This bifurcation, or forced
separation, results in the type of crisis in the sciences which compelled Edmund Husserl to develop
phenomenology (see Section 5.2), and which Thomas Kuhn explored in terms of scientific revolution.
Acta is understood as Q.E.F. (quod erat faciendum; which was to be done). Lanigan (1988) writes that
“our modern view of acta is ‘science” (p. 7). In other words, science is what we do (or that which is
done) to gain knowledge and/or understanding through Q.E.D. or Q.E.I. Lanigan (1988) writes that “the
human sciences are incorrectly seen to be or are treated as methodologically different from the physical
sciences, rather than essentially different” (p. 7). This essential difference, or difference in essence, does
not pit the two sciences against one another, but rather unites them as two different planes or stages of
inquiry, beginning with (1) capta, followed by (2) data, and finally (3) acta.
Here Lanigan offers an outline of a fourth stage (see Section 13.2): “(4) the progressive
repetition of the process in the accumulation and communication of research findings and applications”
(Lanigan, 1988, p. 7), suggesting that as it discovers meaning, research must repeatedly return that
meaning back into the ground level of awareness (capta), re-emerge with truer data, and pass again
through the acta or interpretation stage toward ever more comprehensive understanding/meaning. As
one of the human sciences, communicology and its methodology is based on an overarching scientific
rigor that results from the conceptual unity of all logical parts of a scientific process (Lanigan, 1988).
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4.2 Four Logics
These three metatheory categories—the knowledge or data-collection model (Q.E.D.), the
understanding or capta-seeking model (Q.E.I.) and the action or praxis phase (Q.E.F.)—all function
according to four interconnected types of logic: deductive, inductive, abductive and adductive. All of
these logics are involved in all sciences; the type of reasoning that dominates a particular analysis is
generally a matter of emphasis. Generally speaking, deductive and inductive logics receive heavy
emphasis in Q.E.D. metatheory. While the human sciences also rely on deductive and inductive logics,
they also open more to abductive and adductive logics. To engage in abductive logic is to resist the
notion of inexplicability (Lanigan, 2020).
4.3 Deductive and Inductive Logics
Deductive logic moves from the general toward the particular, or from a broad rule or
statement toward the truth of a particular case. This type of reasoning follows the pattern: rule + case =
result (Lanigan, 1992, p. 219; Lanigan, 1994). Examples include:
1. All men are mortal.

1. All beans from the bag are white.

2. Socrates is a man.

2. These beans are from the bag.

3. Socrates is mortal.

3. These beans are white.

Inductive logic begins with the particular and works toward the general, following the pattern: case +
result = rule (Lanigan, 1992, p. 219; Lanigan, 1994). Examples include:
1. Socrates is a man.

1. These beans are from the bag.

2. Socrates is mortal.

2. These beans are white

3. All men are mortal.

3. All beans from the bag are white.
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These two logical methods are opposites in the sense that they are contraries (Klyukanov, 2018).
They do not represent one type of thinking moving in opposite directions along the same line, but
represent separate types or lines of thinking. Induction can be used to test new hypotheses, starting
with a particular case and working outward toward general laws or rules, and deduction demonstrates
knowledge through the application and reinforcement of established laws and rules of reality. Together,
they contribute to the type of reasoning James Bridle (2018) calls computational thinking, which holds
that the world can be reduced into isolated parts and pieces—bits of measurable data—and that the
more data we collect, the more we will have mastery and control over the world. Computational
thinking, according to Bridle, is a form of solutionism that promotes the concept that any problem can
be solved by the application of computation (p. 4). It depends upon the theme of division. Bridle writes
that such thinking is only capable of computing solutions based on other computed solutions and
previously collected data. In this case, any piece of computational knowledge is only as true or good as
the piece(s) which came before it, which suggests that such thinking is more fallible than it readily
admits to.
4.4 Abductive Logic
Deductive and inductive reasoning address the testing and affirming of hypotheses (new ideas)
and the confirmation of knowledge. However, they do not account for the source or appearance of new
ideas and new hypotheses. Before a hypothesis can be tested, it must come into existence. Philosopher
and mathematician Charles Sanders Peirce explored the type of logic that accounts for the emergence of
a new idea or hypothesis. Peirce called this type of logic abduction (Peirce, 1903). Abduction follows the
pattern rule + result = case (Lanigan, 1988). The examples used above organized in terms of Abductive
and adductive logic are as follows:
1. All men die.

1. All beans from the bag are white.
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2. Socrates dies.

2. These beans are white.

3. Socrates is a man.

3. These beans (must be) from that bag.

This basic pattern does several things: it moves toward the particularity of a single case, it links two
separate or seemingly unrelated perceptions together, and it jumps to a highly fallible yet possible
hypothesis. If I want to determine, for example, where the white beans have come from and why they
are all white, but have no hypothesis, my investigation is stalled. The source of the beans remains a
mystery. At some point, a conversation or experience I am involved with triggers a memory or an
awareness about a certain bag of white beans that exists somewhere, and I am struck with a new idea:
what if these beans came from that bag? I have not discovered the answer, but I have developed a
hypothesis which I can now test and explore using all four types of logic. Peirce (1903) describes
adduction as follows:
The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of insight, although of extremely
fallible insight. It is true that the different elements of the hypothesis were in our minds before;
but it is the idea of putting together what we had never before dreamed of putting together
which flashes the new suggestion before our contemplation (p. 227).
Abductive logic operates in multiple ways, but is especially likely to initiate when we face a situation that
doesn’t make sense. Abduction “is a way of understanding relations between disparate phenomena,
such as in paradox, in light of which the phenomena would no longer appear surprising” (Klyukanov,
2018, p. 135). In other words, abductive logic comes into play in any situation that needs explaining. For
example, if I am accustomed only to brown beans, and then one day I find white beans, the paradox will
trigger an abductive process to determine the relationship between the white beans and my kitchen, a
place where white beans are presumed nonexistent. Without the paradox, we are unlikely to wonder. If
white beans belong in my kitchen, I will not feel curious about their source.
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4.5 Adductive Logic
Adduction occurs on a larger, more universal scale. Involving not just paradox, but moving closer
to anomaly, adduction involves any situation where one seems to reach the limit (Klyukanov, 2018).
Paradox can occur as a curiosity within a working system, whereas a limit is something seemingly
inexplicable—something that breaks or stops a working system or appears insurmountable.
Like abduction, adduction is a means by which a human being, immersed in the chaos of the
unfolding world, makes a leap to intuitive insight or a hunch about the way things may be (Klyukanov,
2018). The difference between the two logics, according to Lanigan, is that “abduction is a particular and
a posteriori claim whereas adduction is a universal and a priori claim” (Lanigan, 1995). Abduction
involves a posteriori insight, which is based on observed experience, within a single context. Adduction
involves a priori insight, and operates on a more universal level across multiple contexts.
Anomaly in the sciences will be ignored or worked around if possible. If it is too significant to be
ignored, it will incite a scientific revolution on the order that Kuhn explored (Kuhn, 1996). It will open
doors into a new reality or new truth or way of being, which necessarily involves destruction of the old
reality and the old truth (Kuhn, 1996). The logic involved with conceiving a new cosmology (Kofman,
2018) or a new reality is adduction. Scientists and the cultures within which they are embedded are
usually resistant to such revolution, and as a protective measure, will often avoid or denounce forms of
logic or ways of thinking that reveal anomaly in an effort to protect existing theories, methods, cultural
habits, etc. Bridle explores how computational thinking creates technology and science that make life
better for large portions of humanity, while in many regards, the same science and technologies are
destructive to other groups of people, other beings and to the natural world. Consider, for instance,
ongoing political debates about fracking, or drilling for oil in wildlife preserves. Consider also that the
science which creates livelihood for commercial farmers and allows the production of large monocrops
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to feed people and livestock also destroys soil and threatens farmers’ livelihoods. These are examples of
anomaly with no cure within science-based industries that require adductive re-vision on a universal or
cross-contextual scale to achieve balance or wellness.
Peirce (1903) writes that “perceptual judgements contain general elements, so that universal
propositions are deducible from them...” (p. 227). The suggestion, here, is that any specific perceptual
judgement (or anything humanly experienced) contains elements of (or passage into) a universal level of
insight. It follows, then, that the reverse would be true: any general rule, law or insight contains
elements of (or passage into) the detailed or particular. Peirce’s work regarding perceptual judgments is
based on logical analysis of the construction of the semiotic process. In other words, Peirce’s work
examines how a human body comes into contact with and perceives/expresses the world through signs,
and what those perceptions/expressions are made of. If every human experience is made up, in some
part, of the world’s most general elements, then it follows that every experience, no matter how
particular, nuanced or seemingly isolated, has the capacity to follow those same general elements
toward a universal or cross-contextual understanding.
Abduction and adduction are logical, then, in that all phenomena are connected to one another
(abduction) through interconnected systems, and all phenomena, by virtue of their existence, are
connected to a universal system which contains the interconnected subsystems (adduction). The
process of juxtaposing paradoxical or anomalous perceptions, and allowing for those perceptions to
access one another through their universal elements, activates abductive and adductive logics. Unlike
computational logic, which is based on a theme of division, abductive and adductive thinking is based on
a theme of unity.

21
4.6 Beyond Computational Logic: Abduction and Metaphor
While Bridle’s work with computational logic is specifically directed at technology-related
science, the concept applies to other forms of mainstream positivist logics in the social and physical
sciences as well. Bridle addresses the limitations of approaching knowledge seeking exclusively in
computational terms, issuing a call to “remake” the metaphors of science and technology in order to
find new, more expansive ways of thinking (Bridle, 2018). Bridle does not attempt to argue against
science and technology in general, as “to do so would be to argue against ourselves (Bridle, 2018, p. 12).
Rather, Bridle addresses the generally underestimated capacity of tropic or rhetorical logic by exploring
the idea that metaphor and paradox—a combination involved in abduction/adduction—possess the
weight and power to carve new vistas of reality or possibility into our relationship with the world.
Gregory Bateson (see Section 2) developed what he called “syllogisms of grass” (Borden, 2017)
as a way to explore beyond the boundary of the logical trap of computational thinking. Despite years of
mainstream scientific training, Bateson viewed the positivist sciences with skepticism, asking whether a
purely computational system for explaining the nature of life could possibly account for a world that
presented itself as a vastly complex interconnection of relationships and patterns. Bateson, following
Peirce and others, saw that different types of logic are capable of producing different types of meaning,
as in the difference between denotative and connotative meaning processes (Borden, 2017).
Bateson explored Peirce’s conception of abductive logic as a way out of the Cartesian thought
cycles that, in Bateson’s view, obscured deeper experiential understanding. In the following quote,
presented in Kaag (2014), Peirce writes about abduction by relating a strange and particular feeling or
sensation that accompanies this spark of novelty, or hypothetical inference.
In hypothetical inference this complicated feeling so produced is replaced by a single feeling of
greater intensity, that belongs to the thinking of the hypothetical conclusion. Now, when our
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nervous system is excited in a complicated way, there being a relation between the elements of
the excitation, the result is a single harmonious disturbance which I call an emotion . . . this
emotion is essentially the same thing as an hypothetical inference and every hypothetic
inference involves the formation of such an emotion (72-73).
Abduction is a spontaneous, emotional, imaginative structure involving creative analogy and metaphor
(Kaag, 2014). It’s the logical process behind hunch and intuition. It does not begin and end with
observable data. Recall that, according to Bridle, computational logic is only capable of computing
solutions based on other computed solutions and previously collected data, and data necessarily
represents humanly-conceived divisions and categorizations. This means that the range of possible
solutions is limited by the ideas and constructs created by a fallible human process. By contrast,
abduction leaps over the boundary wall of the data set and into new insight. Abduction is meant as a
complement to, rather than a substitute for, inductive and deductive logical processes, inviting new
ideas to intermix with existing logics, thus enlivening and expanding logical developments and informing
novel solutions.
To explicate the purpose and value of different ways of thinking, Bateson compared two types
of syllogism—both presented as equally correct. The first is based on the classical example of deduction
as noted above (Borden, 2017):
Humans die;
Socrates is human;
Socrates will die.
To overcome this standard form of habitual thinking, Bateson adopted Peirce’s abductive logic to create
a new form of syllogism:
Grass dies;
Humans die;
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Humans are grass.
The abductive syllogism results in a “yes-but-no" paradox (a metaphor) which reads more like poetry
than traditional science, and that was exactly what Bateson wanted people to see (Borden, 2017).
Metaphor, dream, parable, allegory, the whole of art, the whole of science, the whole of
religion, the whole of poetry, totemism … the organization of facts in comparative anatomy—all
these are instances or aggregates of instances of abduction (Bateson, 1979, p. 142).
Such a metaphor as “humans are grass” is not intended to be taken literally, but rather to upend the
limitations of computational thinking and invite a more creative dialog with the world: the human life
cycle is not so different from that of plants, human bodies emerge from the same earthly elements that
compose the grass, or individual humans are common as blades of grass, etc. Just as Edward Lorenz
suggested that the tiny disturbance caused by a butterfly’s wing stroke can lead to a powerful storm, the
illuminating spark of a single peculiar metaphor or paradox can open a road into new territories of
understanding.
4.7 Understanding v. Knowledge
Inductive logic tests and demonstrates hypotheses, while deductive logic demonstrates and
confirms rules based on those hypotheses. As demonstrated above, hypotheses emerge via abductive
and adductive logic, and all hypotheses are considered fallible. Therefore, when positivist physical and
social sciences present “hypotheses” based on data, they are actually hypostasizing, or treating an
abstraction as though it is a concrete reality. “Data,” after all, is abstracted from “capta.”
Communicology (1) recognizes the difference between hypothesizing and hypostasizing; (2)
recognizes interdependence among deductive, inductive, abductive and adductive logics; and (3) enters
the territory of paradox and anomaly geared with sound logical and analytical tools for discovery.
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Where mainstream physical and social sciences focus on building knowledge based on
observation and data, the human science of communicology focuses on the understanding how things
are based on lived experience of the world. Understanding describes and discovers, while knowledge
explains and invents. The “understanding” model, because it is equipped to accept and address paradox,
has the capacity to answer questions with yes and no, and neither yes nor no, whereas the “knowledge”
model forces a binary “yes or no” answer, altering or eliminating any elements of an inquiry which do
not adhere to the binary structure. Lanigan (1987) describes four key points of differentiation between
understanding and knowledge. They are:
(1) possibility versus probability, (2) particular versus universal [or, singular versus general], (3)
praxis versus practice, and (4) conscious experience versus the experience of conscious [or,
perception/expression as theoretical versus sensation/observation as atheoretical—recalling,
however, that observation is a modality of expression because expression is reflexive to
perception!] (p. 32).
While the first two points of differentiation are self-explanatory, the latter two require discussion.
The term “practice” in a scientific context indicates the application of an existing idea or theory.
By contrast, “’praxis’ means the movement of human existence as creative of meaning, the creation of
meaning in the dialog with the world” (Kwant, 1963, p. 76). Praxis involves the action of everyday life or
that which is lived. This concept of praxis helps to illuminate Lanigan’s fourth and final characteristic.
Within the understanding model, “conscious experience” involves an engagement with the world that
produces meaning through praxis. By contrast, the knowledge model’s “experience of conscious” takes
the “conscious” for granted as an objective reality which is observable, but not negotiable, and without
consideration for the living process from which consciousness emerges. Lanigan calls attention to the
flaw in this view by pointing out that the act of observation involves both perceptive and expressive
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qualities: in order to carry out any scientific observation, one must actively interpret what is observed
and decide how to record it, choose which observations are important enough to be included in a study,
engage in strategic and critical thinking during and regarding observation, etc. All these are forms of
expression, and no such expression is possible without an initial perceptive/expressive interface with the
world or “praxis.” In other words, the logic of physical science and its methods depend upon the prior
logic of the human sciences, as no thing or phenomenon can be observed without the active
participation of a human being to sensually perceive the world and then interpretively express the world
through a unique filter of personal presupposition.
In a social science study, for example, before I can observe a group of middle school students, I
must decide on a context for observation: classroom, social time, detention, etc. I then must employ
bodily sense organs to see and/or listen to the students, bringing stimuli into my body and employing
consciousness to interpret and express thoughts and ideas about my observations. My personal
presuppositions will influence how I interpret the data (participants’ speech, body language, tones of
voice). My attitudes and behaviors also influence the study. If I am kind and friendly, the students will
act one way. If I am cold and intimidating, they will act another way. If I personally enjoy middle school
children, I will view the data one way, and if I dislike them, I will view the data another way. All this
contingency is swept under the rug, so to speak, in the process of gathering and presenting “data.”
When the “data” is presented in a mainstream social science context, it stands for empirical fact and is
taken for truth.
To seek understanding about others’ experience is to view participants as co-researchers (Smith,
2012, 2018) in a system of meaning which we all experience and influence together. “Understanding, in
short, not only requires, but is a human participation in the phenomenon. Understanding is science in
situ and properly called ‘human science’" (Lanigan, 1987, p. 33) (see Section 3). The understanding
model employs a theory and research methodology that differs from theories and processes of the
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social and physical sciences. It is semiotic phenomenology—an expedition into the particularities of
human experience. It is a path toward understanding which depends upon unity between two distinct
fields of study: semiotics and phenomenology. It is discussed in the following section.
5. The Fusion of Semiotics and Phenomenology
5.1 Semiotics is the study of signs and how they work, and of how signs operate within semiosis—a
process of meaning-making. A sign is anything that can stand for anything else: words, sounds,
photographs, bodily gestures, a painting, a melody, etc. Catt (2017) summarizes semiotics as the study
of “what we have in common as cultural sign systems for expression” (p. 2), suggesting that anything we
can experience of the other—people, things and other beings—is shared in common or in
communication through signs. Fiske (1990), presents semiotics in terms of three main areas of study: (1)
the sign itself (as human constructs, signs can be understood in terms of how people use them); (2) the
codes or systems into which signs are organized (this might involve spoken language, sign language, a
system of polite manners, traffic lights, etc.); and (3) the culture within which these codes and signs
operate (see Section 9 for more on culture) (p. 40).
Semiotic examination of the interaction between signs, codes and culture reveals how language
and meaning create cultural sedimentations that dominate the thinking of the day (Martinez, 2011).
Such sedimentations create a story of how one is situated in a particular time and place, and how that
situatedness constrains an individual within structures of meaning and possibility that limit thought
horizons, behavioral choices and other life options. Such a story might involve overarching discourses
like class, race, geography, gender, etc., as well as more particular discourses like fashion norms, music
trends, literature preferences—all the semiotic building blocks of a life and identity. In terms of freedom
or free will, it is possible for an individual to create a different story on an intrapersonal level, but not
always possible to operationalize a different story on a group or cultural level. For example,
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sedimentations around gender and sexual identity in the 1950’s placed different limitations on life for
LGBTQ people compared to the 21st century. Today, being LGBTQ in the United States means something
different than in Saudi Arabia, for example. An LGBTQ person can practice openness on an
intrapersonal level, however the culture of time and place may exert forceful and oppressive limitations
on that individual regardless of intrapersonal attitudes. It can be difficult to recognize such taken-forgranted cultural conditions as sedimented sign systems, as they exist and play out pre-consciously in our
lives. The establishment of a formal study of signs was key for developing insight in this area.
Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and American logician and philosopher Charles
Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), were two of the first thinkers to carefully examine signs in terms of human
language and meaning. Both are generally credited as founders of the modern field of semiotics, though
they approached the study of signs in two very different ways. Saussure put down the foundation for
structuralism, taking a dualistic, binary approach to the study of signs. Each sign, according to Saussure,
is comprised of a signifier (the form a sign takes—a word, drawing, odor, etc.) and signified (the
meaning or the concept that a signifier stands for). Saussure’s dyadic model focused mainly on
relationships between concepts and the signs representing those concepts. As a linguist, Saussure’s
primary interest involved how words operate within a language. Saussure saw words as units of
meaning within a larger linguistic structure, where each word derives meaning in terms of its distinction
or differentiation from other words. For Saussure, a word has meaning only in terms of what it is not
(Fiske, 1990, Hall, 1997).
To aid in this process of differentiation, Saussure engaged the concept of binary opposition to
demonstrate the differences which give signs meaning. For example, day is day only because it is not
night and vice versa. Saussure’s critics recognized gaps in this reasoning, noting that differentiation
through binary opposition is only one rather simplistic way of marking difference—a way which does not
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account for, in this example, dawn, dusk, half-light, twilight, or any other sign indicating the slow
transitional grades that exist between day and night (Hall, 1997).
This gap in reasoning stems from Saussure’s singular focus on words in relation to one
another—a worthwhile exploration of signs in language, but lacking insight regarding the source and
generation of words and other signs. Saussure’s model involved only a mental world of concepts, where
the meaning of one conceptual sign is discovered in relation to another conceptual sign. Peirce
overcame this problem by diverting focus from a study of words in relation to other words within a
closed language structure to words in relation to their objects (Fiske, 1990). Thus, Peirce’s model
located a sign in the physical, non-mental world of material objects (Kjaerhjolm, 2014). It recognized a
lived, tangible, grounded essence in a representamen. Peirce’s semiotics involved a more complex
examination of semiosis (or sign process) as a way of exploring lived human experience of the world (see
section 5.3 for more on semiosis). In a departure from Saussure’s dyadic structure, Peirce’s semiotic
theory involved a triadic model that introduced a third element into sign analysis: the object. According
to Peirce, every sign is a dynamic set of living relationships; not a structure in Saussure’s sense, but
structure as process involving three elements: the representamen, the object and the interpretant.
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some
respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an
equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the
interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object,
not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground
of the representamen (Peirce, 1897).
In Peirce’s triad, the sign is active. It addresses us; it creates. The sign (representamen) occurs when an
object (not necessarily a material object) combines with the human interpretive impulse
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(interpretant)—the experience of the object triggers the interpretive impulse in the experiencer. The
sign, in this view, is adaptive and contingent, transfiguring in real time according to the changeable
natures of each of its three interacting elements. A single object can inspire diverse interpretants in
various experiencers, and may therefore be the source for more than one sign. Signs, in their
contingency and variability, may influence perceptions of an object. There can be no final true
understanding of any sign, but only an infinite range of understandings that emerge according to the
different interpretive conditions of countless different minds (Kjaerhjolm, 2014). Meaning, therefore, is
not fixed or guaranteed. In communicology, Peirce’s model shows that communication is dependent
upon and unfolds according to semiosis (or sign process), and that semiosis occurs not according to
positivist quantification, prediction and control methods, but as a phenomenon which cannot be
directed or isolated, like rainfall, or the sprouting of a seed. Peirce’s model further suggests that a linear
information transmission model of communication cannot account for the true scope of communicative
meaning, as the “sign” sent by a sender may be different from the “sign” received by a receiver. (See
Roman Jakobson’s communication model for more detail).
Peirce’s model does not eliminate the structural element of semiotics, but transforms it from
the rigid constraints of the dyadic Saussurean structure into the living creative process of the Peircean
model.
When we talk about structures in this sense, we should not think of columns that define the
shape and dimensions of a building. Rather, we should understand structures more like the
structure of an ocean current, or the rhythmic structure of the rising and falling tide (Martinez,
2011, p. 57).
To view signs and structures in this way, according to their living vitality, Peirce developed a type of
study which he called phaneroscopy, or “the general survey of the building-materials, the elements out
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of which concepts are to be built” (Peirce, C.S.,1865-1909). Here, Peirce found that in order to deeply
examine signs through the study of semiotics, it was also necessary to reduce the contents of a
consciousness—all that is perceived and expressed—down into their “indecomposable” elements
(Peirce, 1998). These indecomposable or irreducible elements, in other words, are the things themselves.
In his study of semiotics, Peirce entered the existential realm of phenomenology.
5.2 Phenomenology
Phenomenology “conceptualizes communication as dialogue or the experience of otherness”
(Craig, 2007, p. 217). In examining the essence of the other, whether that other is a person, being or the
world itself, phenomenology breaks out of and away from structure to pursue a sort of raw, unmitigated
experience as it exists pre-conceptually. Philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), developed
phenomenology, or a return to the things themselves. With use of the word things, Husserl was referring
to phenomena, or sensed objects, entities and experiences. After growing frustrated with mainstream
objective science for failing to acknowledge its own dependence upon and immersion in human
experience of the world. Husserl viewed such a failure as a crisis within the European sciences (Husserl,
1970). Husserl saw that, in order to claim total objectivity, science must essentially pretend that it is not
a discourse that emerges from and is sustained by an already-existing world.
As a response to this crisis, Husserl developed a rigorous approach for investigating 'things as
they appear' in people's consciousness that would enable the inquirer to 'come face to face with the
ultimate structures of consciousness' or the 'essence' of a particular experience.” (Matua & Van Der
Wal, 2015, p. 23.) In other words, Husserl wanted to discover that which underlies and gives rise to
human conscious experience. As part of this investigation, Husserl developed the concept of Lebenswelt,
or the life-world.
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The life-world is the world of our immediately lived experience, as we live it, prior to all our
thoughts about it. It is that which is present to us in our everyday tasks and enjoyments—reality
as it engages us before being analyzed by our theories and our science...It was Husserl’s genius
to realize that the assumption of objectivity had let to an almost total eclipse of the life-world in
the modern era, to a nearly complete forgetting of this living dimension in which all of our
endeavors are rooted...The consequent impoverishment of language, the loss of a common
discourse tuned to the qualitative nuances of living experience, was leading, Husserl felt, to a
clear crisis in European civilization (Abram, 1996, p. 40-41).
The life-world is the fertile domain of all interconnection with world. It comes before science. Science
and scientists necessarily emerge from within the life-world. It is not conceivable that a researcher or
observer could somehow become separate from or stand outside Lebenswelt—not so long as that
person is breathing and living and experiencing anything at all. Abram (1996) points out that Husserl
understood the life-world as a grounding source of normative influence. In other words, to turn one’s
back on the life-world, allowing it to be eclipsed by some conceptual mathematical human-centered
realm, is to abandon the guiding source for health and balance, opening a gateway toward pathology
and confusion, or in Husserl’s terms, a crisis.
Husserl did not intend to explain the function Lebenswelt, or the human relationship with the
world, as did the mathematically-based sciences. Instead, Husserl’s aim was to describe this relationship
in terms of the subjective, experiential realm which the sciences had taken for granted (Abram, 1996).
To this end, Husserl developed the phenomenological reduction, a method by which an investigator
engages in description, without explanation, of the world as it is experienced. This reduction involved
the process called epoché—the act of bracketing or setting aside explanations and presuppositions
about how the world is. Husserl’s method relied heavily upon targeted attention and meditation that
aimed ultimately to access a sort of pure or transcendental consciousness—a sort of pure essence, free
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from materiality. Husserl’s work never specifically addressed the semiotic element of human conscious
experience.
French existential philosopher and phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961),
approached phenomenology from a radical perspective, rejecting Husserl’s ideal of a transcendental ego
and looking, instead, to the physicality of the human body as the source of essential experience. Abram
(1996) explores Merleau-Ponty's perspective on the body, writing that
If this body is my very presence in the world, if it is the body that alone enables me to enter into
relations with other presences, if without these eyes, this voice, or these hands I would be
unable to see, to taste, and to touch things, or to be touched by them, if without this body, in
other words, there would be no possibility of experience—then the body itself is the true
subject of experience. (P. 45).
This view suggests that every living body is a world in itself which offers itself to and receives the world
of the other. The body does not unite mind and matter as two separate entities, but rather is both mind
and matter at once and together (Kwant, 1963).
This body subject exists in the world with intentionality—but not according to the traditional
definition in which to intend is to work some particular will in a situation. Merleau-Ponty's intentionality
suggest that to be conscious, one must be conscious of something (see Section 6). The body’s
consciousness moves like a wave out beyond itself to assess, to measure, to apply and receive meaning,
and like any wave it recedes, folding all this back into itself. It always moves outward with intentionality
or, in other words, in an ever-questioning, ever “thinking” way. Think of the Martinez quote above, in
which semiotic structures are conceived of in fluid or dynamic terms, like waves in an ocean. MerleauPonty asserts that this intentionality places the body subject in constant dialogue with the world in the
sense that the body-subject is always perceiving and expressing with and in response to the world.
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This dialogue relates not only to pre-conscious experience, but also explicitly to everyday speech
and discourse. Merleau-Ponty examines how the body subject engages with and through language by
presenting two separate purposes and uses of language: language as an existing logical structure/code
that can be used to form messages (parole parlée) and language as a living, generative, poetic
phenomenon (parole parlante).
Parole parlée, or speech spoken, refers to an existing structure in which words already
correspond with meaningful definitions. From this perspective, speech exists independently of thought;
word meaning has already been assigned within the parole parlée system, while thoughts exist
separately inside the minds of individual people. To communicate thoughts, one must simply select from
the already-formed language system the linguistic components that most directly match the ideas to be
expressed.
Merleau-Ponty, however, points out that the “spoken word” or parole parlée system is
comprised of words and expressions that have been passed from one generation to another. They have
become common and shared in terms of meaning with repeated use, though they “must once have
been spoken for the first time. Therefore the ‘spoken word’ refers to the ‘speaking word’ as its origin”
(Kwant, p. 53). Every word, at some point, comes into being through a creative process of meaningmaking. This is what language does—it creates meaning. It’s capacity for novelty and discovery depends
on how that language is used.
To differentiate between parole parlée and parole parlante is to acknowledge that immaterial
thought is not independent of physical speech, but that “on the contrary, thought becomes thought in
speaking” (Kwant, 54). This involves the physical act of speaking, the conversational relationship with
other person/people/world, the constantly unfolding phenomenological experience of the world, and
the semiotic interpretation of that experience. Turkle (2015) points out that, at the beginning of a

34
conversation, one does not know precisely what one will say—thoughts are born as words being spoken,
and a person often comes to realize personal feelings or attitudes by speaking them.
Consider further that the body itself “thinks” through a sort of physical, preconscious
communication with the world. This preconscious, preverbal thought exists through what MerleauPonty calls “practognosis,” or a thought in action. “In walking, for example, we take into account the
condition of the ground, for we do not walk in the same way through a forest and over a smooth road”
(Kwant, 54). And yet, a person does not need to measure the ground or calculate a strategy for different
styles of walking according to varying terrain. The human body, in order to move, balance, etc., assesses
physical circumstances, considers options for appropriate action, processes innumerable microadjustments or micro-decisions in relation to the surrounding world. It knows and does all this preconsciously throughout every bodily action. Just as preverbal knowing comes into existence through
physical action, unarticulated thought comes into existence through the action of human speech.
...Thought comes to exist in a new way and, in this new way of existing, thought depends on the
word. To know something here means to be able to indicate it in a coherent succession of
words. Knowledge cannot be divorced here from the words (Kwant, 55).
This connection between pre-verbal (phenomenological) and verbal (semiotic) knowing reveals how the
human body-subject relates to and interfaces with the preconscious world, a dimension Merleau-Ponty
referred to as existence.” According to Kwant (1963), Merleau-Ponty worked to demonstrate that “our
existence is the soil in which meaning, light, germinate.” This line of thinking creates a chiaroscuro of
light and shadow, where speech throws light (meaning) on the shadow/soil of the mysterious dimension
of existence (Kwant, 1963). Such insight reveals “a mode of being that hitherto had largely escaped
man’s attention...his greatest achievement is that he did not only discover the hidden dialog between
body and world but also managed to penetrate into it” (Kwant, 1963, p. 34-35).
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Abram (1996) addresses the body-world dialog, writing that Merleau-Ponty disclosed “a more
eloquent way of speaking, a style of language which, by virtue of its fluidity, its carnal resonance, and its
careful avoidance of abstract terms, might itself draw us into the sensuous depths of the life-world" (p.
44). Through analysis of the nature and role of language and speech in meaning generation, combined
with the phenomenology of a body-subject in dialogue with the world, Merleau-Ponty suggests that
human beings emerge from the ground or soil of existence through physical language, and that life
stories and desires and beliefs, that cities and symphonies and epic poems are all creations of language.
Within this suggestion lie two shining clues: (1) if humans find themselves in a place of darkness or
pathology, they must return to the soil and rebuild; (2) the way back is discoverable through semiotic
analysis of language. This involves an unraveling of the computational thinking model discussed above,
in which each new idea or step or solution is stacked atop a teetering scaffolding made up of the
countless other ideas, steps or solutions that people have previously added. This also relates to
Lanigan’s fourth stage discussed in Section 4.1.
Merleau-Ponty employed a methodology based on Husserl’s original descriptive methodology; a
reduction process that consists of three steps: (1) Sensation, (2) Interpretation, and (3) Perception
(Lanigan, 2010). However, though Merleau-Ponty used this method, he did not offer a systematic
description of how it works (Kwant, 1963). According to Lanigan, however, Merleau-Ponty found a
missing piece in Husserl’s methodology.
Merleau-Ponty offers a major correction to the method of Husserl’s phenomenology by
stressing the importance of semiotics in the description of phenomena, the importance of
structural analysis in defining (reducing) phenomena, and the importance of hermeneutic
principles for the interpretation of phenomena” (Lanigan, 2010, p. 108).
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Merleau-Ponty's philosophical correction clarified communication as a process involving a body subject
in a state of active and intentional dialogue with the other, or with the world, where the action is
experience or phenomenology, and the dialogue through speech is semiotic. Peirce also specifically
examined the interplay between experience and semiotics and developed a phenomenological method
which he called semiotic. Lanigan recognized consistency between these two views to successfully
identify and further develop Semiotic Phenomenology as both a theory and a method (Lanigan, 1988).
5.3 Semiotic Phenomenology
Semiotics and phenomenology combined to form semiotic phenomenology—the theory and
research methodology used in communicology.
Although semiotics and phenomenology are commonly understood as belonging to intellectual
traditions that are at odds, for communicology, the vocabularies of both traditions allow for
descriptions and interpretations of lifeworld features that neither can accomplish on its own:
namely, the logic of signs and their embodied experience in the process of semiosis (Butchart,
2018).
Semiotics examines how human beings use signs to create reality and meaning. Phenomenology focuses
on temporarily setting aside those same signs and meanings to examine the lived experience of things as
they actually are, without the filter of semiotic presupposition.
Upon close examination, however, it becomes clear that everything a human being perceives,
knows, thinks, says and does is encoded through signs or, in other words, understood and experienced
by way of a code. Even “the perception of reality itself is an encoding process” (Fiske, 1990, p. 66). The
experience of human perception, including vision, hearing, taste, etc., is the result of sensory stimuli
entering a body through the sense organs, undergoing translation through neurological systems, and
finally entering human consciousness as a set of signs related to that thing which was originally sensed.

37
For example, what we perceive as music is made up of audible musical notes—signs which stand for the
actual sound waves that enter our ears. One could propose then, through semiotic phenomenology,
that human experience of the world is semiotic, and that signs at their most fundamental level are
phenomenological.
Lanigan has demonstrated that what appears as an apparent conflict between semiotics and
phenomenology actually unites the two in examining two different but intertwining functions of human
experience. According to Smith (2018),
Richard Lanigan's development of "semiotic phenomenology" has paved the way for a
broadening of both phenomenology and semiotics, expanding in complementary fashion the
epistemological horizons of each, linking onto existential, hermeneutic, ethnographic, rhetorical,
critical-cultural and postcolonial theories and methods (p. 23).
A subtle but important change occurs when a researcher brings semiotics and phenomenology into
relation with one another—something like a chemical reaction: as discussed above in the description of
Peirce’s work, the focus moves “from the study of signs and sign systems to the study of semiosis, or the
ongoing action of signs” (Martinez, 2011, p. 98). To study semiosis is to study how experience and signs
weave into one another, at all network levels of communication, to form the living fabric that is culture
and meaning. This applies to anything from the meaning of a simple sentence to the meaning of a
complex cultural phenomenon like institutional racism.
Semiotic phenomenology studies all aspects of human conscious experience, and it does so
primarily through analysis of language. However, “the only way humans can know or study language as
a sign-system is by using it, by taking it up as both an object and means of study—thus the bringing
together of semiotics and phenomenology” (Martinez, 2011, p. 99). When Lanigan (1988) wrote that
communication is a relationship between an organism and its environment (or a person and the
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person’s life-world) he also wrote that “at its most sophisticated level this relationship is one of
language” (p. 11).
Semiotic phenomenology is language studying language, not as a structural system frozen in
time, but in terms of semiosis. Language presents the most reliable and compelling access into the
obscure origins of human life experience. To examine the meaning of any human situation—historical,
political, religious, personal—one seeks language about that situation. If someone asks, “what do you
mean?” a person usually responds via language. Poetry, journalism, tax law, and medicine are all
recorded and managed via language. It is inescapable. It is the very atmosphere in which live and
function, and holds clues to how humans come to know and understand this world we live in.
When considering analysis of language, it is important to recall the difference between MerleauPonty's parole parlée and parole parlante, or the difference between reified linguistic structure and
dynamic living interface with the world. The latter involves the spontaneous and simultaneous
intertwining of perception and expression into a sort of being or body made of signs, or meaning
embodied. The communicator, in other words, uses signs to recreate or reproduce the shape and
“contours of experience” (Merleau-Ponty, 1970, p. 25, Lanigan, 1988, p. 173).
This intertwining of perception/experience and expression/semiotics suggests that human
bodily perception is always more than a biological function involving sense organs. Rather, perception
occurs in conjunction with expression. One does not perceive without also experiencing some
simultaneous form of expression, whether it is a thought, a bodily reaction, a feeling, a recognition,
verbal language, a preverbal choice, etc. Not only are perception and expression co-occurring, but they
are also reversible, reflexive and reflective. “This means that what we come to perceive in our embodied
relation to others and the world is always already an expression of our interconnection with others and
the world” (Martinez, 2011, p. 101).
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Perception influences expression, and expression influences perception. The bi-directional
movement between the two is what we call reversibility. Reversibility is “the process of converting
consciousness into experience and vice versa” (Lanigan, 1988, p. 14, Dillon, 1983). The idea that
perception and expression shape and influence one another is what we call reflexivity. Reflexivity works
as a kind of feedback loop, where the outputs of a system circle back as inputs, continuously re-creating
and re-directing the whole. Reversibility allows bi-directional movement between the sensory
experience of perception and the co-emergent semiotic expression that is consciousness (i.e. thinking,
speaking, acting). One ignites the other and vice versa. Reflexivity creates potential for growth and
change. The idea that perception and expression mirror one another is reflectivity.
For example, perhaps I perceive homelessness as a nuisance and blame homeless people for
their condition. Here, I am perceiving some sedimented cultural attitude (expression) that already exists.
This perception mirrors my own expressive thoughts and words about homelessness. This situation is
reflexive: my perception influences what I think and say about homelessness while likewise, my
thoughts and words about homelessness influence how I perceive homeless people. In this example, I
embody cultural attitudes that are harmful and oppressive to vulnerable people. My participation as a
body-subject in the culture would serve to reinforce and prolong the crisis of homelessness. To
understand a cultural problem like homelessness, one must understand the interdependent perceptive
and expressive elements of the communicative process that create the reality of homelessness—give it
body, make it manifest, bring it into actual being by ignoring the suffering human bodies struggling to
survive on the street (see section 7: Embodiment). Semiotic phenomenology and communicology can
help address cultural problems.
One pervasive problem which touches almost every part of human lived experience is our
tendency to approach communication with a natural attitude. This thesis presents a critical theory and
research method with capacity to create “harmonious disturbance” (Kaag, 2014 )in everyday
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communicative presuppositions. In other words, it aims to address and challenge the automatic way in
which we communicate and view communication, with a goal to initiate deep change and
reorganization. To such an end, the practical tool of a syllabus (See part III) is designed to (a) attract
students to the study of communicology; and (b) effectively transfer understanding regarding
communicology.
Semiotic phenomenology and communicology can help address cultural problems. Reflexivity
allows for new types of thinking and speaking (expression) to influence more clarity in perception, and
reversibly, for clearer more truthful perception to inspire beneficial changes in collective thinking and
speaking. Catt (2010) writes that “only with reflexivity can scholars make a real difference in human
affairs” (p. 15).
The section on methodology (Part II) outlines how semiotic phenomenology is applied in
research.
6. Consciousness
Consciousness is “wonder before the world” (Landes, 2014, p. lxxvii; Lanigan, 2005 p. 17). It is a living
interface between a person and the world. French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2014) writes
that consciousness is the perspective “by which a world first arranges itself around me and begins to
exist for me” (p. lxxii). As explored in the previous section, consciousness involves semiosis, or the
process of meaning as it unfolds through the experience of signs (sign process). The body perceives
stimuli (light and shadow; sound waves) through sense organs—this is experience. The body
simultaneously expresses awareness or behavior in response to symbolic representations of that stimuli
(seeing images; hearing sounds)— this is consciousness. If unmitigated experience occurs at the worldbody intersection, then consciousness occurs where bodily perception intersects with bodily expression.
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Perception and expression—body and sign—arise together and influence one another, forming human
conscious experience.
As discussed in Section 5.2, consciousness involves intentionality. In this context, intentionality
refers to the idea that, in order to be conscious at all, one must always be conscious of something
(Kwant). Intentionality is a binding thread that connects us to the world (Merleau-Ponty, 2014).
Grounded in this living matrix of world-body-consciousness, we see that no knowledge can
encompass or explain the true nature of the world, because all knowledge is built symbolically in
response to the world. According to Merleau-Ponty (2014),
To return to the things themselves is to return to this world prior to knowledge, this world of
which knowledge always speaks, and this world with regard to which every scientific
determination is abstract, signitive, and dependent, just like geography with regard to the
landscape where we first learned what a forest, a meadow, or a river is (Page #).
Therefore, when communicology seeks to “explicate human consciousness,” it is addressing the process
by which we humans spin communication like a web out of conscious experience. “Communication
inheres in the intentionality of consciousness” (Catt, 2017 p. 14). In other words, if one is looking for the
source or location of communication, one finds it within the intentional threads that bind us to the
world.
7. Embodiment
If consciousness is cultural and semiotic, then behavioral embodiment is personal and
phenomenological (Catt, 2017).
In describing the concept of embodiment in the context of communicology, Martinez (2011)
writes that semiotic phenomenology “stakes out...a logic of embodiment that establishes the fact and
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presence of human consciousness as it is situated within the concrete reality of other human
consciousnesses and a physical environment” (p. 97). Embodiment gives consciousness a way of being in
the world—a living shape and form that can interact with other beings—starting with the unrefined
experience of body-in-the-world and expanding into the more abstract semiotic phenomena of culture.
Martinez describes how culture relates to individual people in the sense that it arises through human
communication with and about the world (Martinez, 2011).
When we talk about embodiment we are referring to the human condition of living within
culture whereby humans unconsciously and preconsciously take up and re-create the norms of
culture in experience. These last two words, “in experience,” are crucial. What we experience
does not emerge in a vacuum. It is precisely “in experience” that we embody the practices and
norms of our culture and community (Martinez, 2011, p. 100).
In addition to characterizing the individual relationship with culture, embodiment can refer to
the more abstract concept of embodied discourse. The following section explores how human discourse
takes material form. It is this form—in artifact and action—that gives discourse opportunity to take
shape in and become involved with the world, just as our physical bodies give our own consciousness an
opportunity to exist in the world.
Lanigan writes that “embodiment is a matter of perception that discovers expression;
embodiment is a preconscious being of the person that is the lived-comportment prior to a
consciousness that has experiences” (Lanigan, 1995, p. 354). Embodiment, then, refers to the human
state of being that occurs prior to conscious awareness, explication or critical analysis. This preconscious
lived-comportment can be explored and examined in a search for understanding regarding the nature
and source of human communication.
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Likewise, and in terms of embodied discourse, embodiment refers to the dynamic living system
of human discourse before it becomes aware of its own existence and looks critically at itself. Discourse,
as it emerges from human communication, becomes a living fabric or living body that is kept alive
through the constant and ongoing experiential embodiment that builds and reinforces it.
Communicology researchers—just like all people—are tethered to and woven into this fabric. Therefore,
to say that researchers analyze discourse is also to say that discourse analyzes itself. A communicology
researcher jumps into the stream of discourse, experiencing and becoming a part of it even while
observing and studying it.
Embodiment occurs at a level of awareness where the natural attitude holds sway; in other
words, where things and conditions are taken for granted, or viewed as “just the way things are.” When
communicology examines embodied discourse, it examines how humans gave body or contour to a
particular discourse through communication, where and how the discourse lives, and how it exerts
influence on people, other living beings and the world. In studying discourse, communicology identifies
the tangled knot of its embodiment, and then works to loosen the tangle so that it might be understood
and potentially reconfigured.
8. Discourse
The word ‘discourse’ is most prominently known as a linguistic term meaning “passages of
connected speech” (Hall, 1997, p. 44), or “a verbal interchange of ideas, especially conversation”
(Merriam-Webster dictionary). However, in his work exploring the history of human knowledge,
Foucault expanded the word’s meaning to indicate
a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—a way of representing the
knowledge about—a particular topic at a particular historical moment...Discourse is about the
production of knowledge through language. But...since all social practices entail meaning, and
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meanings shape and influence what we do—our conduct—all practices have a discursive aspect
(Hall, 1992, p. 291).
This conceptualization of discourse unites language (consciousness; what we say and think), with human
action or practice (what we do) into one total system or operation of discourse. (Both language and
practice involve the perceptive-expressive reversibility explored above.) Discourse constitutes
everything that human beings know and do and create. Just as a bricklayer might use verbal language to
ask a fellow worker to “pass me another brick,” the bricklayer also performs the action of adding the
brick to the wall. It is not the words alone or the physical bricks or the isolated actions which build the
wall. Instead, language (consciousness), materiality and action (experience) intertwine to create the
material structure of the wall, as well as its meaning in terms of the wall’s physical and symbolic purpose
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1990; Hall, 1997). As a spider spins webs, the human spins discourses.
Think of any individual person’s life as a system of language-experience interfaces—or stories—
that contain everything this person has learned and experienced, thought, discussed and believed.
Consider how this fluctuating totality of beliefs and experiences influences the person’s actions—what
this person did, created, etc., and how this person influenced and interacted with others. These
interfaces which make up a human life can be examined through human science in terms of the
“meaning of the discourse as a life-event" (Lanigan, 1988, p. 147).
If an individual human life is a discourse, then so are the collective lives that make up a family;
the policies and practices of an organization; the culture and tradition of a particular town or village;
cultural institutions like education, criminal justice and health care; and global institutions of inequality,
violence, immigration, climate degradation, etc.
The perceptual-expressive force of discursive meaning generation moves outward from stories
and events, growing into discursive formations. These formations involve the existence of a discourse, in
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a particular style with specific themes and tones and particular to a specific time period, which is shared
widely across multiple institutional sites and outlets (e.g. schools and universities, divisions of
government, media, faith institutions, etc.). These formations shape the conceptual frameworks that
influence how people acquire knowledge, build identities and view reality, and may include sweeping
concepts like ‘madness’, ‘punishment’ or ‘sexuality’ (Hall, 1997). The discussion regarding semiotic
sedimentation in Section 5.1, which examines how cultural constraints linked to one’s situatedness in
time and space may impact a person’s actions and thought horizons. The example considered how being
gay in the U.S. in the 1950s involved different constraints than being gay in the U.S. in 2021. Such
constraints are discursive formations that solidify in religious thinking, law, film and entertainment, etc.
Two points must be emphasized: (1) Discourse is not simply conversation about things and
knowledge. Rather, discourse creates and produces things and knowledge. (2) According to Foucault,
“nothing which is meaningful exists outside discourse” (Hall, 1997, p. 44). This is not to say that material
objects do not exist. We sense and experience and interact with material objects in the world every
day—brick walls, tree roots, food, water, dry socks, etc. Consider what any of these objects can
potentially mean in the context of various discourses and cultures. “Foucault does not deny that things
can have a real, material existence in the world. What he does argue is that nothing has any meaning
outside of discourse” (Hall, 1997, p. 45).
Discourse is the means by which our lived human experience takes narrative shape in the world.
This is how the story of human life emerges both conceptually and materially, and takes on meaning.
Discourse builds Husserl’s lifeworld for each individual person--what Catt (2010) describes as “a matrix
where culture and conduct continually and perpetually meet” (p. 2). To find and master a logically and
philosophically sound study of discourse is to find a way into this matrix, which is often hidden from
view and/or taken for granted.
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9. Culture
Klyukanov (2010) writes that “culture, like communication, is easy to define but difficult to
understand” (p. 183). Culture might be defined as “shared meanings” (Hall, 1997, p. 1), “patterns of
practice, understanding, and preference that are shared and transmitted from generation to
generation” (Martinez, 2011, p. 100), “shared patterns of behavior” (Klyukanov, 2010, p. 183), and
“generalizations about people and groups of people...what people do and say and what they have done
and said” (Ruesch & Bateson, 1968, p. 40). Such variety suggests that the true nature of human culture
cannot be so easily pinned down. Martinez (2011) clarifies that in order to understand culture within
the context of communicology and semiotic phenomenology, it must be emphasized that
culture is re-created through communicative practice...It is very important that we see [culture]
as an orientation toward preference that is within each of us and which we actively take up and
re-create both preconsciously and unconsciously as a choice of context (p. 100.)
Culture is inextricably linked with language and dialogue. “Language...sustain(s) the dialogue between
participants which enables them to build up a culture of shared understandings and so interpret the
world in roughly the same ways” (Hall, 1997, p. 1). Culture is a form of conversation, and “conversation
implies something kinetic. It is derived from words that mean “to tend to each other, to lean toward
each other,’ words about the activity of relationship” (Turkle, 2015, p. 44). Such a perspective indicates
that conversation/dialogue is that which tethers us to each other as well as to our individual and
collective realities—our own experience of the world. According to Fiske (1990), “communication is
central to the life of our culture: without it culture of any kind must die. Consequently the study of
communication involves the study of the culture with which it is integrated” (p. 2). Martinez (2011)
describes the purpose of communicology as relates to culture:
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In order to be able to examine the presuppositions that inform our most fundamental
modalities of seeing and understanding, we must be able to examine those very sedimentations
and intersubjective conditions. This is precisely the point and purpose of communicology and its
methodological expression as semiotic phenomenology (p. 55).
Dominant forms of scientific analysis used in the physical and social sciences generally seek to delimit
the potential meaning(s) of a topic such as culture in order to isolate and study it. What is studied, then,
is not culture, but a frozen fragment of culture captured within imposed boundaries. So captured,
culture becomes a simplified or “bounded essence” subject to “reification--i.e. turning dynamic flowing
patterns into static, fixed ‘cultures’” (Klyukanov, 2010, p. 183).
It is certainly more manageable to conduct scientific study when culture is forced into a static,
reified state, just as it is easier to dissect and study a human body after the life has been taken from it.
Under such control-based circumstances, researchers may build a catalogue of data and knowledge, but
will access little to no understanding about the living functions and patterns of the culture (or creature)
so cut, pinned and segmented.
Communicology lifts boundaries of definition and control from the subject of culture, and
studies it as a living system growing out of a dialogue (discourse) between the human and The Other.
Communicological inquiry into culture involves the study of dynamic flowing patterns (Klyukanov, 2010)
and activity of relationship (Turkle, 2015) of lived human meaning and reality.
10. Synthesis and Discussion
Having moved through all the concepts outlined at the beginning of this paper, the discussion now
circles back into Lanigan’s definition of communicology as presented in the introduction. The explication
in sections 1-9 provides a working understanding of the philosophical and logical concepts
operationalized in the definition, repeated here:
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Communicology is the science of human communication. One of the Human Science disciplines,
it uses the logic-based research methods of semiotics and phenomenology to explicate human
consciousness and behavioral embodiment as discourse within global culture...
This condensed summary leads into a more robust description:
Communicology is the study of human discourse in all of its semiotic and phenomenological
manifestations of embodied consciousness and practice in the world of other people and their
environment. As a young discipline in Human Science research, Communicology is the critical
study of discourse and practice, especially the expressive body as mediated by the perception of
cultural signs and codes. Communicology uses the logic based research method of semiotic
phenomenology in which the expressive body discloses cultural codes, and cultural codes shape
the perceptive body—an ongoing, dialectical, complex helix of twists and turns constituting the
reflectivity, reversibility, and reflexivity of consciousness and experience (Lanigan,
Communicology.org).
Culture generally moves toward a totality of sameness, where a universalizing system of thinking or way
of life shuts out the Other and all its strangeness or exteriority (Saldukaitytė, 2016). Such totality
suppresses potential ruptures through the enforcement of sameness or continuity. Communicology,
through its method of semiotic phenomenology, intentionally ruptures that which is taken for granted
through a sort of deconstruction of—or a stepping back from—the dominant epistemic center (Anderson
& Baym, 2004), seeking understanding through lived experience rather than re-analysis of sedimented
objective norms. Communicology opens to both the dominant center as well as the alternative ways of
discovery. Anderson and Baym (2004) argue that “the truths found in the epistemological margins...may
ultimately be richer, perhaps more complete, than the understandings generated within the epistemic
center” (p. 605).
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This paper has proposed that communication is a creative force that builds cultures and
realities, and that discursive sedimentation within culture leads to constraints that limit what we are
capable of thinking, knowing and doing. Such constraints can generate harmful problems, and as those
constraints are re-created and reinforced through communication and culture, people come to mass
unconscious agreement that this is just the way things are (the natural attitude). Even when problems
(i.e. homelessness, wealth gap, technology-related social problems, climate change) are identified, these
same constraints prevent us from seeing solutions and/or alternative possibilities.
This paper has also argued that the threads of intentionality can indeed be loosened through
semiotic phenomenological praxis, allowing for opening in terms of view and discovery. What we must
explore now is how these concepts come together to form a research methodology that can be used as
a discovery tool and applied to relevant issues and problems. According to Merleau-Ponty, this begins
with a kind of rupture. “We must—precisely in order to see the world and to grasp it as a paradox—
rupture our familiarity with it, and this rupture can teach us nothing except the unmotivated springing
forth of the world (Landes, 2014, P. lxxvii).
The three-step method of semiotic phenomenology is based on Husserl’s process of
phenomenological reduction and epoché. Husserl originally developed the technique to provide detailed
accurate descriptions of the true essence of “things themselves.” As mentioned above, Merleau-Ponty
made a correction to Husserl’s method of reduction by adding a semiotic element to the description of
phenomena (Lanigan, 2010). This correction made way for the development of a more contemporary
model of interpretive phenomenological research, which shifts the purpose of the research toward the
pursuit of an in-depth understanding of the experience itself, as well as the embodied experience of any
research participants, with efforts concentrated on revealing the dormant or hidden meanings within
the contextualized experiences of the individual, as well as the explicit meaning which the individual
consciously attaches to the experience (Matua & Van Der Wal, 2015). Peirce’s triadic model of semiosis
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contributes to this interpretive model in two vitally important ways: it (a) links the sign to the material
world through the object, and (2) it allows for any sign to link with an infinite range of possible meanings
(interpretant) (see Section 5.1).
The method of semiotic phenomenology does not attempt to extract a set of generalized facts,
but to reveal particular meaning as it moves within and through discourse(s). Interpretive
phenomenological research never reaches a determinate end, as it will always reveal new questions
(Smith, 2012). This is why Merleau-Ponty said “the most important lesson of the reduction is the
impossibility of a complete reduction” (Landes & Merleau-Ponty, 2014, P. lxxvii).

Part 2: Methodology
11. The Three-Step Reduction Process of Semiotic Phenomenology
The three-step reduction process of semiotic phenomenology is the method by which
researchers use and operationalize theory to reveal new understanding and, in the case of
communicology, to (a) seek truth and understanding about the world itself, not just the world mediated
by culture; and (b) identify and respond critically to social problems and constraints that cause harm to
human beings and the world they inhabit. In describing this method, I will draw most heavily from
Richard Lanigan’s 1988 book “Phenomenology of Communication: Merleau-Ponty's Thematics in
Communicology and Semiology,” and Jacqueline Martinez’s 2011 book “Communicative Sexualities: A
Communicology of Sexual Experience,” in which Martinez draws from and beautifully interprets
Lanigan’s work.
What follows is a three-step method which is both recursive and synergistic (Lanigan, 1988;
Martinez, 2011). This means that each single step in the process involves the integrated movement of all
three steps (see figure x). Each basic or general step contains multiple complex sub-steps. Consider, for
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example, the description step: to describe any phenomena, the human conscious must first perceive
and process the phenomena. In other words, “the moment we try to describe an experience, we have
already interpreted it” (Martinez, 2011, p. 102).
It is important to understand, before analyzing the following process as it is broken into pieces
and categories, that neither communication nor understanding naturally occur in consecutive
categorized steps or segments. Meaning in communication occurs all at once, like a full symphony. We
capture and segment it into different parts only as a means for analysis and understanding (Martinez,
2011; Smith, 2012).
Figure 1.
Lanigan’s Theory and Methodology of Semiotic Phenomenology
Description

1. DESCRIPTION
2. Interpretation
3. Reduction
4. Description

Examine and then bracket
presuppositions and modalities that
influence description. (Do not explain.
Only describe.)

Reduction

5. REDUCTION
6. Interpretation
7. Reduction
8. Description

Pull from the description the pertinent
or “shining” pieces and engage
imaginative free variation.

Interpretation 9. INTERPRETATION
10. Interpretation
11. Reduction
12. Description

Interpret linkages or themes toward a
thematic whole.

Source: Adapted from “Human Communication,” from Richard L. Lanigan, Phenomenology of Communication
(1988), p. 9.

11.1 Description
Before one can describe experience, one must go back to the moment when one selected that
particular experience as worth describing, or saw in that particular experience some relevant theme or
framework to explore (thematizing). Before description begins, one interprets the thematic purpose of
the selected experience (why do I choose to describe this experience and not another?). One then
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reduces that material to “seek out the ‘modality’ of thematization that led us to experience that
experience as we did” (Martinez, 2011, p. 103). In other words, one seeks the mode(s)—the type of
behavior, way of life, way of expression—that made that experience unfold in a particular way for the
particular participants. This going back process engages the researcher in the invocation of epoché or
the bracketing process discussed in Section 5.2, where we realize and set aside our assumptions and
presuppositions in order to move closer to the thing or experience itself. Following both the
interpretation and reduction steps, one is now able to offer a description of the actual experience as it is
lived (rather than unconsciously providing a description of one’s cultural assumptions about an
experience). This process applies whether a researcher is looking at one’s own experience, looking at
written text, or working with narratives from interviewees or research participants (in phenomenology,
research participants are thought of as co-researchers). A description serves the purpose of data capture
(capta, or what has been taken). In this stage, the researcher captures all that may be meaningful or
relevant.
Summary of Description Phase
Select an experience to describe.
Step 2: Why that experience? What theme or framework did you see/interpret in that particular
experience that made you (or the co-researcher) choose it?
Step 3: Within that theme or framework, what modality (or way of life or type of behavior) led
you to experience the experience as you did?
o

Engaging these two stages invokes the epoché

Step 4: Now that you have bracketed your assumptions about the experience, you are ready to
describe the experience as it is lived. Resist the temptation to explain or explicate at this stage.
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11.2 Reduction
The description, if done well, will include much more detail than can be used. Some parts will show
essential meaning, while others will fade to a uniform background. During the reduction step "the task
of the researcher/analyst now turns to determining what is gravel to be washed away, and what
remains as gold--that is, the most pertinent signs of the phenomenon to be analyzed further” (Smith,
2012, p. 53). Another way to say this is that reduction involves a process of abstraction whereby the
researcher pulls from the description elements that stand out or shine out. “We select parts from
within the description, or descriptions, and shift them around here and there seeking to make
differentiations through our varying combinations. In phenomenological terms, we call this imaginative
free variation (Martinez, 2011, p. 103).
Through reduction, a researcher abstracts these pertinent descriptive points from the
description and allows them to influence or interact with one another. Recall Merleau-Ponty's assertion
that thought and/or meaning occurs or comes into being through language. In this stage, the researcher
may find “thoughts” that hadn’t occurred or emerged until the description process has been spoken or
written. Recall also Peirce’s work with abductive logic, where the juxtaposition of two seemingly
unrelated ideas, or the bringing together of paradoxical ideas, can illuminate new hypotheses and
original thinking. These philosophical concepts find action within this stage. A researcher moves
through the interpretation, reduction and description phases of this step by noting and maintaining
“that as we move through each step, we are still relying on our already thematized (interpreted)
understanding of our experience and the phenomenon” (Martinez, 2011, p. 103). Even after the
bracketing process, a researcher cannot separate entirely from the particularity of one’s own experience
and view.
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For more technical detail on the imaginative free variation procedure, see Smith (2012, p. 5455).
Summary of Reduction Step
Abstract or pull away from the description those elements which stand out or shine out, and engage in a
process of imaginative free variation, allowing abductive reasoning to set the stage for skilled
interpretation.
In step 6, note the influence of your own interpretation, both on how the descriptive elements
were formed and on how you choose elements to abstract from the description.
In step 7, further bracket found assumptions and presuppositions that found their way into your
description.
In step 8, you are ready to put down or describe the insight generated through your reduction.
11.3 Interpretation
The interpretation step involves the analysis and explication of the key elements of the phenomenon as
discovered through the previous two steps. The general purpose of this step is to clarify the essential
meaning of those key elements which emerged from the description and reduction stages—a process
which can be called semiotic or hermeneutic analysis or phenomenological interpretation (Lanigan, 1988,
p. 10). The researcher, at this stage, must engage a radical hermeneutic to link all those observations,
interviews and/or other data which have been selected and worked through the reduction step (Smith,
2012). Martinez (2011) points out that any such interpretation will inevitably be influenced to some
degree by the researcher’s own “thematizations and interpretive schemes” (p. 103). Smith (2012)
describes the process as follows:
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One pulls together what participants know for themselves; what they say that suggests nuance
of meaning that may not be fully known, but that the researcher can infer from his or her
"privileged" position; and reflective interpretations of the findings that go beyond what was
learned in the interview itself (p. 62).
Summary of Interpretation Step
You have collected a great deal of detail in the description. You have washed away the gravel, so to
speak, and revealed the pertinent or shining pieces. Now you have something to work with.
Step 10: Interpret linkages between the shining pieces revealed during the reduction step.
Step 11: Identify personal or subjective “interpretive schemes” or biases and intentionally
bracket, focusing interpretive work on revealing, and not imposing.
Step 12: Describe the interpretation as it has emerged from the three basic steps of description,
reduction and interpretation. Here the work exposes a signified, according to Lanigan’s chart, or
in other words—a meaning.
To illustrate the process, it may be helpful to imagine a box full of an author’s papers—mixed receipts,
shopping lists, bill stubs, and some sheets of original poetry or journal notes. Rather than attempting to
interpret the entire heap of unorganized stuff—seeking creative connections between a beautiful stanza
fragment, for instance, and an old owner’s manual for a toaster—you focus on those pieces that you
have deemed most relevant to an analysis of the author’s literary work. The description phase would be
the taking of all papers that are available and potentially relevant. The reduction phase involves
carefully pulling out from the heap the manuscript pages, author’s notes and literary fragments. Finally,
the interpretation stage involves looking at all these selected pages, juxtaposing and re-sorting them,
allowing a hermeneutic theme to arise that illustrates the lived experience behind the writings. This
process as a whole is not comprised of quantifiable or mechanical steps, but requires practice and skill—
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not unlike playing an instrument. Anyone can drag a bow across the cello strings, but only a skilled
musician creates music.
12. Method and Paradigm
The three-step process as outlined above is not a clearly delineated, rigidly structured or easy-toimplement system. According to Martinez (2011), “if the previous discussion leaves you with the feeling
that these ‘three basic steps’ in phenomenological research are very complex, deeply interconnected,
and not entirely distinct, then you are understanding correctly” (p. 103). This is no indication, however,
that the method is confused. On the contrary, Lanigan’s method encompasses and mimics the true
natural process of communicative meaning-making. Only when a method can work synergistically with
real processes of human communication can it approach truth in its discoveries.
When conducting research using the methodology of semiotic phenomenology, one must
maintain awareness regarding the paradigm (or research framework) in which the work develops.
Lanigan (1994) differentiates between the phenomenologist’s paradigm (postmodern) and the
positivist’s paradigm (modern) by pointing out differences between order of analysis (OA) and order of
experience (OE). Lanigan (1994) clarifies the difference by comparing
the encounter with evidence (OE) as it appears to consciousness versus the method (OA) of
experiencing the evidence. In both orders of judgment, it is a matter of combining the experiencer
(researcher) with the activity of experiencing (researching) the phenomenon being experienced
(what is researched) (p. 112).

57
The idea of combining the researcher, the activity of experiencing and the phenomenon itself
into a dynamic system of investigation is consistent with Peirce’s triadic combination of representamen
(researcher), interpretant (activity of experiencing) and object (the phenomenon itself) when all three
elements are able to work reflexively in a
process of meaning-making (semiosis).

Figure 2
Positivist’s Paradigm

This is not the way of mainstream natural
and social science investigation, which
generally holds that there is an objective
reality with its own meaning that can be

OE ----------------------------------------------------------------- >
Experiencer >

Experiencing >

Experienced

OA ---------------------------------------------------------------- >
Experiencer >

Experiencing >

Experienced

known and studied independently of
human experience. Therefore, positivist
researchers use the OE model (Figure 2),

Source: “Comparative Research Procedure Involving the Order
of Experience (OE) and the Order of Analysis (OA),” from
Richard L. Lanigan, The Human Science of Communicology
(1992) p. 20.

taking the experience of a phenomenon for granted as “the way things are,” unconsciously assigning
their own experiencer view, including any presuppositions, as a starting point for knowledge seeking,
and then repeating the same order in the scientific analysis.
In this model, a researcher studying family communication, for example, might collect data that
places research subjects into categories of “single mother,” “poverty” and “divorced,” and then proceed
outward, away from the family’s lived experience, according to generalized and assumed meanings of
those categories. The positivist’s paradigm positions the researcher’s experience and related
assumptions as ground or beginning of the knowledge-seeking process, and bases all other knowledge
on it. This framework implicitly suggests that nothing exists prior. This model works for analyses that are
designed to collect and measure data according to natural scientific methodologies. However, it does
not allow access to or insight regarding capta—that level where a person encounters the dynamic and
real lived experience of conditions and phenomena.

58
A phenomenologist researcher, by contrast, recognizes that anything we choose to focus on and
come to see in our work is connected to our own original experience of perception and expression
(Martinez, 2011). As discussed in Section 4.1, human beings cannot possibly be aware of all the sensory
information we are exposed to and unconsciously processing at any given moment. We focus on, to a
degree, preconsciously, what will enter our awareness and how. This is capta, or what is taken. When a
researcher involves capta in an analysis, the researcher reverses the order of experience so that the
analysis returns toward the original experiencer interface with The Other.
A phenomenologist researcher is inclined to view research participants not as “subjects” to
observe and categorize, but co-researchers who work with the researcher. The arcing back or going
back movement presented in the

Figure 3

Phenomenologist’s paradigm allows a

Phenomenologist’s Paradigm

researcher and co-researcher(s) to
OE

>

Experiencer >

Experiencing >

repeatedly examine and test layers of

experienced
meaning as they unfold in experience. If a

<
Experiencer

< experiencing

OA
< experienced

Source: “Comparative Research Procedure Involving the Order
of Experience (OE) and the Order of Analysis (OA),” from
Richard L. Lanigan, The Human Science of Communicology
(1992) p. 20.

researcher is studying family
communication, for example, every new
concept, category or hypothesis would be
examined in terms of the experience of a

particular family (Eicher-Catt, 2005). Assumed categories like “single mother,” “poverty,” or “divorced”
would have no meaning of their own, but would gain meaning through the lived experience of the
particular family members and family culture involved in the research.
By adding arcs to the top and bottom arrows in Figure 2, the Phenomenologist’s Paradigm can
be visualized as a circle. This will not work for the Positivist’s paradigm, as both arrows point in the same
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direction—away from the experiencer interface. In the Positivist’s Paradigm, the top and bottom arrows
can be placed next to one another, spreading out to form a linear expansion:
Figure 4
Positivist’s Paradigm and Computational Thinking
OE
> OA
-> OE
>
Experiencer>Experiencing>Experienced
Experiencer>Experiencing>Experienced
Experiencer>
Adapted from Lanigan’s “Positivist’s Paradigm.” Source: “Comparative Research Procedure Involving the Order of
Experience (OE) and the Order of Analysis (OA),” from Richard L. Lanigan, The Human Science of Communicology
(1992) p. 20.

This model shows how computational thinking operates, positioning the beginning of any analysis atop
previous data-oriented solutions. Again, Bridle (2018) reveals that such thinking is only capable of
computing solutions based on other computed solutions and previously collected data. As it
progresses or expands, it moves farther and farther from the original Order of Experience—away
from original human interface with the actual world. The line in figure 4 shows that a new OE
involves interface not with the world, but with the previously computed cycle.

13. Exploring an Expanded Methodology
At this stage I will argue that the existing triadic theory, research methodology and paradigm
outline are yet incomplete. I argue that the addition of a fourth research step serves as the force which
arcs or bends the lines of the phenomenologist’s paradigm into a circle. Though Lanigan formally
presents the semiotic phenomenology research method as a three-step process, Lanigan also directly
references a fourth step in the research and discovery process (see Section 4.1): “(4) the progressive
repetition of the process in the accumulation and communication of research findings and applications”
(Lanigan, 1988, p. 7). A problem arises when attempting to operationalize Lanigan’s fourth step within a
three-step model.

60
The key to Lanigan’s 4 th step is the progressive repetition. To retrace the steps of the process
and go back to a less-developed stage would be a regression, whereas a progression involves movement
toward a more advanced stage. Lanigan’s description of a fourth step suggests that as meaning is
abstracted through the three stages, a researcher must carry that meaning into capta-level
(experiencer) awareness without regressing. At this point the question must be asked: from what source
do the abstractions emerge? In other words, a fourth step suggests that capta (that which presents itself
to our consciousness) must arise from somewhere or something. Lanigan (1992) calls it the concrete:
“the coherence of a whole or category before anything is abstracted from it” (p. 215). Merleau-Ponty
called it “the soil,” as in “our existence is the soil in which meaning, light, germinate” (Kwant, 1963). The
suggestion here is that progressive research cannot find direct progressive access to the capta state
without passing through that step which gives rise to capta.
Based on Lanigan’s work and descriptions, I argue that a fourth step already exists within the
semiotic phenomenology framework, and that by identifying and adding it into the formal model, a
researcher gains access to a step that Rotman (1987) and Kjaerholm (2014) call zeroness. This zeroness
can be conceptualized as Merleau-Ponty's soil. Consistent with this metaphor, the process of entering
the soil of zeroness can be likened to a growth and harvest cycle involving (0) germination: hidden, soil,
shadow, decomposition, regeneration; (1) seedlings: appearance, light; (2) growth: fruits, taking form;
(3) harvest: gathering, combining, finishing. Lanigan’s fourth step is where discovered meaning turns
back into the ground level of awareness—the pre-capta level—but not by undoing the harvest and the
growth. Instead, the fourth step of zeroness completes a loop, moving research/understanding along a
circular path that leads into the soil of existence/the source of lived experience. Kjaerholm (2014)
approached this concept of zeroness through analysis of Peirce’s ontologies in comparison with nonwestern views regarding “secondness.”
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13.1 Peirce’s Ontologies
Peirce’s ontological categories of “firstness, secondness and thirdness sum up the forms and
conditions under which anything can exist, within the framework of the ontological tradition that Peirce
belonged to” (Kjaerhjolm, 2014, p. 185). Firstness might be described as the intangible world of
preconscious existence, or the pure, unmitigated human interface with the world as it presents itself.
Peirce described it as “what the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes, before he had even
drawn distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence’ (Kjaerholm, 2014, p. 185). Firstness is
the realm of capta, a vast field of innumerable sensible detail in pure form, from which the human takes
up particular focus, and which the human filters through unconscious layers of sedimented
presuppositions and lived experiences to form secondness. Secondness involves the world of sensed
tangibility where we interact, experience, touch, see and discover—where objects and qualities
manifest, differentiate and take form. Secondness involves the appearance of objectivity, and is the
realm in which data is collected and measured. Thirdness involves an interpretant, or a mediating
thought that connects firstness with secondness. Thirdness has to do with symbolic systems of habitual
meaning-making (Kjaerholm, 2014) that determine how we view and interact with the world. To
illustrate, essential, pure hotness (firstness) manifests in the experience of smoke (secondness), and my
symbolic understanding of the connection between heat and smoke (fire) is the interpreting thought, or
interpretant, that completes the generation of meaning. These three ontologies correspond with
elements of Peirce’s sign system as follows:
Figure 5
Peirce’s Sign System
Firstness

Icon

Representamen

Secondness

Index

Object

Thirdness

Symbol

Interpretant
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The icon is a visual representation, or a thing as it appears. For example, a photograph is a direct
representation of the thing photographed, and an ancient cave painting can be understood by modern
viewers because of its iconic quality. When Adam opened his eyes on the first day, he experienced pure
icon. The index is attached to or indicative of the thing it represents. For example, smoke is an indexical
sign that indicates fire; a hoofprint in the snow is an indexical sign that indicates deer, and a road sign
with an arrow pointing in a particular direction is an indexical sign that indicates both place and
direction. Finally, the symbol has no direct relationship with the thing it represents. For example, the
letters in an alphabet, though technically only arbitrary shapes, represent different sounds in language,
and letters can be arranged into words that stand for various objects. Symbols have meaning only
according to commonly agreed-upon code. One must understand the code to understand the symbol.
Thus, ancient symbols accompanying cave paintings in the caves of Font de Gaume, for instance, cannot
be understood by modern viewers, because we do not understand the code of the ancient artists.
Section 5.1 explores the relationship between representamen, object and interpretant.
When this triadic system of ontologies from Peirce comes into contact with non-western
ontology, the model does not break down, per se, but rather becomes incomplete. For example,
Kjaerholm (2014) addresses the concept of “‘double-substance thinking’ which assumes precisely what
Peirce’s ontology precludes: that something can exist prior to firstness, and accordingly we stand in
need of applying a new concept, zeroness, in an understanding of this ontology” (p. 186).
The key differentiation between the two ontological types (single-substance versus doublesubstance thinking) resides in secondness—in nuanced understandings of indexicality and materiality.
Peirce claimed that icons and indices alone assert nothing (Atkin, 2005). According to the philosophy of
Swami Narayanananda, however, soils and muds of different textures and consistencies naturally
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organize themselves in different areas and layers, and such segregation immanent in nature is a sign of
how all separations must occur. This iconography and indexicality is a semiotic indication that to
separate into different classes, such as a caste system, is unavoidable (Kjaerholm, 2014).
The conclusion is that there must be a difference in ontology, which makes it possible for
Narayanananda to read signs in a way that is radically different from Peirce’s...A clue as to the
ontological difference which makes such signs possible in the Indian context may be found in
Sankhya philosophy, which introduces the idea of a subtle substance, unreachable by the human
senses, but which is the cause of the coarse substance that humans can observe and experience.
(Kjaerholm, 2014, p. 195).
This concept visible in Sankhya philosophy appears also in other—often indigenous—ontologies. Navajo
(or Diné) Native American ontology assigns causal or assertive properties to a type of fine or subtle
substance that directs or infuses course material with a type of agency necessary to create signs. For
example, the “Holy People,” in the traditional Navajo worldview are living sources of a power (Vecsey,
2015) which gives rise to and emerges through course or rough secondness: Holy People are materially
embodied in the four great mountains (just as Aboriginal ancestors are embodied in particular land
forms). When a Navajo closes a fist, the mountains take shape in the four knuckles rising from the whole
hand, which is the Earth, and so a fist should not be used to hit another person, because the Earth and
mountains are sacred (Vecsey, 2015). Here, coarse matter is the bulk and stone of the mountain and
the bone and blood of the hand; and subtle matter is that which makes materiality come together into a
holy mountain-body, or holds the blood and skin and bone together and causes the animated form of a
hand to be a sign of the mountains and the Earth. Specific types of power live within particular physical
places (Johnson, 2019), and emerge through particular types of materials and not others. For instance,
in crafting a yucca-leaf drumstick for a healing Chantway ritual, a Navajo chanter or medicine man
passes by a hundred yuccas before finding a tree with appropriately assertive indexicality: leaves shaped
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and situated in a particular way indicating suitability for containing or conducting the substance that
must enter the drumstick to complete the healing ritual (Johnson, 2019). After a drumstick is sung and
prayed over and used in a ritual, it must be pulled apart to release and sacrifice that which has been
transferred into it through the voice of the chanter and the sounds of the songs and prayers (Johnson,
2019).

Kjaerholm (2014) points out that in Malaysian cultural ontology, there exists a subtle substance
called ur which connects a Tamil person with their home or place of origin. It can only be accessed by
spending time in the place and allowing ur to be absorbed. If a Tamil person is born away from the
family’s village of origin, that person must travel to the village and stay there for a period of time in
order to fully access their own potential and personal capacity by connecting with the subtle substance
of that particular place.

Aboriginal people across Australia also describe materiality in terms that suggest both a course
and a subtle substance. The Dreaming, or Dreamtime, is the non-linear place-based creation time that
exists and is accessible simultaneously as the present moment, as the past and as the future. It is a sort
of “every when,” or “time out of time” (Howitt & Suchet-Pearson, 2003)-- a powerful temporality which
is hidden behind and within the objective material land that we experience and interact with (Abram,
1996).

Before the land had taken form, Ancestors from the dreamtime “emerged from their slumber
beneath the ground and began to sing their way across the land, seeking food, shelter and
companionship” (Abram, p. 164). In this way, they sang the world into being. Their paths are marked
physically on the land today. The evidence is all around. A sandhill is more than a pile of sand—it is
where the Ancestor Little Wallaby left his buda (skin waterbag). An Aboriginal person may understand a
body of water as a freshwater lake and simultaneously understand it as the place where Little Wallaby
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urinated during his journey at the dawn of creation (Abram, 1996). Here, land and water formations are
signs of a hidden element in the land—the Dreaming.

Signs like these come from, sustain and re-create songlines—auditory maps made of detailed
songs that tell the stories and follow the paths of the Ancestors’ journeys and the land’s creation. The
songs move toward and call attention to different places of power and energy. They guide travelers
along criss-crossing paths through harsh and arid landscapes. After the Ancestors completed their
journeys, they “went back in,” re-entering the ground at a specific place and going back to sleep and
into the dreaming. Their power and life metamorphosed back into the earth and became that place.
They are there still, possibly in the form of a hill or a rock, and dreaming. No materiality is lifeless or
purely mechanical; land is dreaming. “The Dreaming nurtures the landscape as a nourishing terrain”
called Country. Country “in Aboriginal English encompasses people (countrymen), place (homeland) and
past, here-and-now and horizon” (Howitt & Suchet-Pearson, 2003, p. 6).

Within this ontological framework, the Dreaming and Country cannot be conceived of as
separate from one another. They intertwine to become the material world. Aunty Shaa (2019) of the
Gumbaynggirr People, differentiates between the subtle substance of country and the course substance
of landscape or land in terms of communication:

Country is everywhere. It is everything. Country nourishes us, holds us, communicates with us
and teaches us. Country is our history, our family and our future. Country is our relationships,
our food, our memories and our emotional connections; it is energies and winds, waters and
songs, spirits, dreams and stories. Country is a rich landscape – rich with connections. While
landscape or land is seen in dominant frames as something to be bought and sold, and
something that sits in the background, Country is active and knowledgeable. It is never
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background and its beauty is in its teachings, patterns and relationships, and in the traditional
Aboriginal lore/law that it holds and that helps us to live (Smith, A. S., & Yandaarra, 2019, p. 2).

In both Navajo and Aboriginal ontologies, physical landforms possess two types of materiality: a
sandhill is a sandhill, yes, and it is also Little Wallaby’s water bag; a mountain is a mountain, obviously,
and it is also the body of a Holy Person.

This concept of subtle substance doesn’t exist only in indigenous ontologies, but can be found
preconsciously within dominant Western thinking. For example, Kjaerholm (2014) explores the idea that
a physical object can be considered “irreplaceable”—for example, an object once owned by a deceased
relative. A replacement or copy of the object, regardless of the copy’s monetary value or precision, is
not considered equal in meaning to the original. Westerners find meaning within the material substance
as a type of living connection to a relative (or to a place or time, etc.). This concept of object
irreplaceability suggests a subconscious recognition of a subtle substance which infuses the realm of
secondness (Kjaerholm, 2014). There is a sense that the object itself—its material situation in the world-absorbed some vestige of the lost relative’s subtle materiality. For instance, your late greatgrandfather’s watch is a watch, of course, and yet it is also some part of the man who touched and used
and valued it for so many years—the particular watch has something of that life in it, while a replica
does not.

Florence Williams (2017) explores another subtle communication phenomenon titled the “3-day
effect.” Studies show that three days spent in a wild natural environment made measurable impacts on
research participants’ overall creativity, mood and cognitive performance. Williams also calls this the
phenomenon the “nature fix.” Western science is not, at this point, able to fully explain reasons the
phenomenon, but tests administered in the field show with little doubt that the effect is real. This
“nature fix” is consistent with practices like forest bathing in Korea, or ecotherapy used in Scotland to
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address mental illness. It is the idea that some subtle communicative substance within the materiality of
the natural world connects dynamically and with a degree of agency in ways that are observable and
measurable via controlled experiments. To “connect dynamically” is another way to say “communicate.”

These examples demonstrate how a sort of other secondness is recognized, either explicitly (as
in many indigenous frameworks) or preconsciously (in the Western framework), across multiple
different cultural ontologies, and is unaccounted for in Peirce’s structure.

In a certain sense one could describe [zeroness] as a constant state of ‘possession’, where
coarse substance is possessed by subtle substance, and this would make it logical to pay such
attention to iconic signs, since they point to the, somehow more real, world of subtle substance.
This is an ontology which also makes the Indian [Sankhya] attitude understandable as a
communication with a subtle kind of secondness, through the medium of another coarse kind of
secondness. Thus, what is termed secondness in Peirce’s semiotic theory in the Indian [Sankhya]
context hides another and more real secondness, so that the coarse secondness is, so to speak,
secondness by proxy. The question is whether new semiotic terms should be coined in order to
take this into account, or whether it is enough to point out that the interpretant in the Indian
context is based on an ontology not accepted in the Peircean system (Kjaerholm, 2014, p. 196).
I would like to highlight Kjaerholm’s concept of communication with a subtle kind of secondness through
the medium of another coarse kind of secondness as an important description of how and why one
might engage with zeroness through research. In other words, this key phrase addresses the questions:
“why is the idea of subtle substance relevant,” and “how does zeroness influence research?”
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13.2 A Fourth Step
This paper explores the idea of adding new terms and a fourth step to Lanigan’s semiotic
phenomenology research model in an effort to account for Lanigan’s “progressive repetition” through
the “concrete.” It is difficult, however, to conceptualize or organize a realm of existence that is, from the
dominant Western ontological perspective, difficult to reach or perhaps even non-existent. MerleauPonty himself navigated this realm—the soil of existence—via intuition without ever finding a consistent
way to systematize the navigation process (Kwant, 1963). I believe this other secondness is, in many
ways, incommensurable with Eurocentric research methods, and therefore is difficult to access using
dominant Western methodologies. Communicology, however, is intentionally open to engagement with
abductive and adductive logics, and therefore has greater capacity than many Western models. Its
structure has capacity to carry research beyond the positivist boundary line that so often delegitimizes
other or different types of knowledges within dominant scientific frameworks. In other words, I propose
that communicology has the capacity to unite Western-style academia with non-Western
communication ontologies. To illustrate, I begin with Lanigan’s existing three-step methodology for
semiotic phenomenology as a base, and expand as follows:
Figure 6
Demonstration of a Fourth Concept
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The first three rows of the table contain a compilation of Lanigan’s analyses of the semiotic
phenomenological model (Lanigan, 1992, Lanigan, 1994, Lanigan 2010, Lanigan, 2010), and are based in
large degree on Peirce’s semiotic. The fourth row represents my own experimental effort to incorporate
a fourth concept into the existing framework based on Kjaerholm’s (2014) concept of “zeroness”. The
term “voxa” is a working term based on the Latin word vox, meaning voice, sound or word. Voxa in this
context refers to voice as the material embodiment of experience. In this case, voxa (or voice) indicates
(1) agency, as in “having a voice” (Weidman, 2014), (2) efficacy, as in using the “voice” to produce
meaning and change through signs, and (3) as the material, muscular sound and/or gesture of language.
In the description of the Aboriginal concept of Country above, Aunty Shaa & Yandaarra (2019)
write that “Country communicates with us and teaches us...Country is active and knowledgeable.” In
other words, Country possesses voice. It sings and inscribes signs and Ancestors’ paths into the Earth. In
Sankhya philosophy, the material world demonstrates agency, inscribing signs into the soils and muds.
In the Navajo chantway ritual, the muscular, audible songs and prayers take form in the world through
the chanter’s embodied sounds and movements, and then interact with some specific piece of course
materiality to cause change. From the modern Western Eurocentric perspective, specific material
objects—not a copy or replacement—contain a kind of sacredness or vividness related to a person,
place or time that is not present. Experiments around the 3-day effect in nature suggest that a level of
subtle secondness in the world, unaccounted for in Peirce, acts as some communicative voice or gesture
which causes changes in the course “everyday” materiality and function of a human being.
In the wake of such an assertion, questions arise around how voxa is to be incorporated into the
research process, and how it makes a difference in the discovery process. First, recall once again
Kjaerholm’s statement suggesting “communication with a subtle kind of secondness through the medium
of another coarse kind of secondness” as a way to understand the way these two types of secondness
interact with one another. This interaction can be organized as follows:
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Figure 7
Zeroness and Voxa
Zeroness

Subtle matter, the soil,
existence

Firstness

Preconscious interface;
experience
Coarse matter
Interpretation; meaning

Secondness
Thirdness

Voxa (voice; agency; material source of capta;
chiasmic interchange between materiality
[body/world] and the symbolic [conceptual mind])
Capta (in which we focus on and take up particulars
among the many)
Data (what is given; “objective”)
Acta (the act of research, inquiry and
interpretation; praxis)

The information in this table is perhaps more effectively visualized as four inter-looping circles
forming a loop that allows for progressive and reversible movement (Figure 8).
Figure 8
Reversible Inter-Looping Cycle
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The logo for the International Communicology Institute is a knot–like image of four interconnected
circles made from an infinitely-looping thread:

Note that the shaded areas in Figure 8 where the circles overlap, along with the space in the center,
create a knot-like or flowering shape similar to that of the logo. The symbol itself suggests a four-part
approach to communicology methodology.
An adapted methodological process guide might function as follows:
Figure 9

4-Step Semiotic Phenomenological Reduction
Description

1. DESCRIPTION
a. Interpretation
b. Reduction
c. Description
d. Grounding

Examine and then bracket
presuppositions and modalities that
influence description. (Do not explain.
Only describe.)

Reduction

2. REDUCTION
a. Interpretation
b. Reduction
c. Description
d. Grounding

Pull from the description the pertinent
or “shining” pieces and engage
imaginative free variation.

Interpretation

3. INTERPRETATION
a. Interpretation
b. Reduction
c. Description
d. Grounding

Interpret linkages or themes toward a
thematic whole.

Grounding

4. GROUND
a. Interpretation
b. Reduction
c. Description
d. Grounding

Connect the research with the voice,
agency or physicality (course
materiality) of the subject or
phenomenon; open the research
process to allow access to a subtle
materiality through the course
materiality.
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Source: Adapted from “Human Communication,” from Richard L. Lanigan, Phenomenology of Communication
(1988), p. 9.

13.3 Grounding
Grounding is a step that resists solutionism. It is a step that addresses the limits of any discovery, and
therefore is the step which creates space for adductive logic (see Section 4.5). By the time a researcher
has completed the interpretation step, an answer or a solution may begin to take shape. Grounding is a
step that involves the decomposition and regeneration of answers and solutions. Bridle (2018) puts it
like this: “Computational thinking supposes—often at an unconscious level—that the world really is like
the solutionists propose. It internalises solutionism to the degree that it is impossible to think or
articulate the world in terms that are not computable.” To enter the fourth step is to “think the
problem” outside of computable terms, and within the context of both realms of materiality--zeroness
and secondness.
All stages of any research process inevitably involve elements of all four types of logic discussed
in Section 4. However, the reduction and interpretation steps within Semiotic Phenomenology engage a
researcher rather explicitly in abductive processes that focus on addressing paradox and making
connections within the context of particulars. These steps involve an implied limit, as they are limited to
the particulars of the specific research topic or questions being addressed.
The grounding step is that which carries the research beyond its implied limit, moving from
within the boundaries of one particular context to the more universal level of adduction. It is that level
where a whole-systems view comes to inform the research. It is the link that connects the subject of
investigation to its material existence and origin. Bridle calls this process “re-earthing.” As an example of
re-earthing, Bridle explores and “grounds” the central metaphor of the internet: the cloud. The
metaphor of the cloud implies weightlessness, lightness, shapelessness and invisibility, however the
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cloud, which serves a digital information storage function, is not amorphous or made of thin air. “It is a
physical infrastructure consisting of phone lines, fibre optics, satellites, cables on the ocean floor, and
vast warehouses filled with computers, which consume huge amounts of water and energy and reside
within national and legal jurisdictions (p. 7).” Bridle points out that to think “the cloud” in terms of its
grounded materiality makes it possible to understand it as an energy-consuming technology implanted
by humans into and onto the body of the earth, and directing communication in very specific ways.
Another way Bridle grounds technology and “the cloud” is by pointing out that technology, just like
human life, depends upon nonhuman things. Humans don’t live without molecules, bacteria, food,
water, air, and “the cloud” doesn’t exist without raw natural materials transformed into cable or
satellite. Bridle (2018) demonstrates how even a complex, formless system like the high-frequency
trading infrastructure and the economic system it drives, is grounded in materiality:
in silicon and steel, in the speed of light through glass, with fog and birds and squirrels.
Technology can be an excellent lesson in the agency of nonhuman actors, from rocks to bugs,
whenever they obstruct or permit, chew through or short out, our lines of communication and
power (p. 14).
This concept of re-earthing applies not just to technology, but to anything than can be problematized
and studied. To understand how Bridle approaches this “grounding’ work, it is important to note that in
addition to re-earthing, Bridle talks about re-enchanting our tools. The term “re-enchant” suggests that
grounded phenomena are always already imbued with some level of enchantment—even if
“enchantment” refers simply to the fullness of their interconnection with all things—and that
computational thinking severs that connection in order to dismantle complex systems into parts and
pieces that can be measured and manipulated in isolation. If this is the case, then enchantment may,
very simply, be a byproduct of the undoing of solutionism. To suggest re-enchantment is not to suggest
that humans engage in some fantastical realm of human imagination. If anything, that’s what natural
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sciences, technology and computational thinking do for us—create imagined realms. Rather, to reenchant is to return to the thing itself—the place, the person, the voice.
According to Bridle, the key to re-enchanting our tools is the construction of new metaphors.
Here I return to Gregory Bateson’s Syllogisms of Grass (section 4.6) as an exploration of the logic of
enchantment. We have already explored abduction as a fundamental and necessary form of logic—no
new idea could ever occur without it. Bateson urges the reinvigoration of abductive logic as a way for
humans to see beyond the limitations of their own computed solutions. In other words, Bateson
suggests intentionally activating and operationalizing abductive logic (steps 2 and 3 in the Semiotic
Phenomenological process) as a path toward adductive insight (step 4). Bateson’s example led us to the
statement that “humans are grass.” Above, in examining the concept of subtle substance, we saw that
mud inscribes, mountains are living bodies, an antique watch is a grandfather, and the cloud is a mass of
hardware dug into and mounted upon the earth.
Grounding or re-earthing, then, is a return to and/or recognition of the material source of any
phenomenon under examination. In all cases, a phenomenon will have origins in the form of a physical
body, whether that is a human body (body-subject) or the material body of the earth. Communicology is
a process that moves toward opening, and the proposed grounding step should provide space for the
culmination of such opening. Therefore, the fourth step offers no precise solution or fixed answer
regarding the problem or phenomenon under analysis. In fact, Bridle (2018) writes that
Along the way, what may be presented as ‘revelations’ about the ‘truth’ of the world should
always be held at arm’s length, as mere...rethinkings of that world. Indeed, arm’s length should
be the resonant, representative gesture of the work, as holding something at arm’s length has
the effect, from another perspective, of pointing at something else in the distance, something
beyond the immediate realisation, and promising more (p. 14).
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To engage the grounding or re-earthing step is to include in the research process an exploration of
Merleau-Ponty's “soil of existence”—that hidden, non-computable realm where phenomena cannot be
known through separation and isolation, but can be understood in terms of their complex
communicative interrelation. Within this soil, everything with material origins (and that means
everything) can potentially decompose and regenerate. This is the realm of subtle substance, where the
force of a fine and mysterious (a.k.a. non-computable) materiality rises in and through course
materiality to form discourses, and then falls back in again, in a wave-like motion that mimics the waves
of intentionality explored in section 5.2 (Landes & Merleau-Ponty, 2014, Kwant, 1963). Grounding and
re-enchantment involve “metaphor, allegory, the whole of science...art...religion...poetry... these are
instances or aggregates of instances of abduction” (Bateson, 1979, p. 142), and present the only clear
passages to the realm of adduction. It is fantasy (as opposed to enchantment) to imagine that humans
could exist in the world without abductive and adductive engagement.
It is no stretch—even within the positivistic realm of the natural sciences—to suggest that some
type of subtle materiality, or agency, exists within non-human living organisms. After all, natural science
cannot produce materiality, but collects, observes and manipulates it. No scientist can make something
out of nothing, and material energy is indestructible (Bateson & Ruesch, 1968). There is debate in
Western philosophy and science around the question of whether non-human things have agency.
According to Latour (2005), intentional, causal agency is not the only type of agency to consider. The
question when considering agency in non-human and/or non-living entities, claims Latour, is “[d]oes it
make a difference in the course of some other agent's action or not? Is there some trial that allows
someone to detect this difference?” (Latour, 2005, p. 71). If the answer to both of those questions is
yes, then an actor—nonhuman or otherwise—is exercising agency (Sayes, 2014). According to Latour
(2004), “there might exist many metaphysical shades between full causality and sheer in-existence:
things might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render possible,
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forbid, and so on” (p. 226). To consider agency from this perspective during the grounding step is a way
for a researcher to consider “subtle substance.”
13.4 Summary of Grounding Step (see figure 9):
Step 4a: Link entities or phenomena under analysis (along with any associated insights) to their
material origins.
o

This step may appear deceptively easy. Keep in mind that language and culture can be
conceptualized as material living fabrics, and that any embodied experience has its own
particular physicality. Likewise, embodied discourse is a living, adapting entity that takes
material form. The process of linking with material origins involves viewing phenomena
through a lens of embodiment.

o

This step also may reveal interconnectedness between large grounded systems. A
researcher may find that, in grounding a particular problem or phenomenon, the
analysis will take on elements of universality as well. This represents the emergence of
adductive logic, and is an important part of the process.

Step 4b: The explicit link with materiality along with interpretive work from step 3 may initiate
solutions or revelations about the problem or phenomenon. Such insights are valuable and
useful to a degree. At this stage, however, the researcher holds those interpretive insights at
“arm’s length,” letting go of any attachment to these ideas which might cause a researcher to
cling to them as solutions, holding them too close in. When held at arm's length, a researcher
can see these insights in relation to other systems and ideas, and can see what the insights point
to, or what lies beyond—the coming stretch along a path which cannot logically arrive at any
final end.
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Step 4c: The researcher opens to adductive logic to experiment with the construction of new
metaphors, which can be approached via Lanigan’s work, as well as through Bateson’s
perspective on syllogisms of grass. Such universal, cross-contextual descriptions are not
designed to be calculated or measured. Rather, they come together to explore voice or agency
(subtle substance) within the physical origins of the problem (course materiality—people,
objects, places, etc.) under analysis.
o

Adductive logics will be fallible. The grounding step, which involves both decomposition
and regeneration, fully opens to this level of fallibility, as insights at this stage are meant
to be held at arm’s length and allowed to form, fall apart, and re-form.

o

This step need not be forced, but rather presents an opening.

o

As with the original reduction step, focus should lie in describing the phenomena as it is
lived while resisting any urge to explain.

Step 4d: Here, all previous steps converge toward the wonder of the phenomena, now
grounded in some form of materiality, and within a living system. The phenomenon becomes
understandable in terms of interconnection with other living systems. At this stage,
communicology is the tool which becomes re-enchanted, and so fortified, can break through the
hard shell of computational or Q.E.D. logic that encases many modern views and knowledges.
14. Applications and Further Research
Modern solutionism and computational thinking have contributed to declining wellness and productivity
in multiple wide-ranging areas, including massive environmental degradation, declining successes in
pharmacology, personal privacy and autonomy, opacity and confusion regarding technology and AI,
human social functioning, empathy, family relationships, and mental health (Bridle, 2018, Turkle, 2015,
Zuboff, 2019). At the same time, modern science and technology—products of Q.E.D logic and
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computational thinking—have profoundly improved human life in many ways. To argue against them
entirely would be to abandon ourselves (Bridle, 2018). The challenge is opening science into a larger
vision that starts from the phenomenological soil of lived experience of a living world, and finding
balance between different logics and methods of knowing. Today, as part of dominant discourses
around race, environment, community divisiveness and mental health, many scholars and other thinkers
are calling for renewed consideration of other knowledges, especially non-Western knowledges, in
building a path toward a healthier, happier global society—toward Latour’s “new cosmology” (Kofman,
2018). For example, the Australian government has collaborated with Aboriginal people to employ
indigenous fire prevention methods and other land management projects, while Aboriginal
Gumbaynggirr storyteller Aunty Shaa (Smith, 2019) seeks a way that indigenous and modern thinking
can come together to inform a new way of knowledge seeking and living together in the world. A high
degree of incommensurability makes such collaboration difficult to put into practice. Communicology, as
both a theory and method, has capacity to explore all lived experience from a logic-based perspective,
offering a framework that can bring modern Q.E.D.-based logics and methods into alignment with
alternative or non-western logics and methods. This capacity comes from semiotic phenomenology,
where the wonder of lived experience interfaces with the symbolic (and potentially computational)
realm of conceptual thinking to create the discourses that we live by.
Communicology is the study of embodied human discourse. The word embodied demonstrates
that the discipline itself is already grounded in physical materiality. Any human endeavor is an embodied
discourse, even if some (e.g. physical sciences) choose the fantasy of objectivity. To study embodied
discourse is to study culture. To study culture is to study embodied humans. To study embodied humans
is to study human-other interface. To study human-other interface is to study human
interconnectedness with larger systems of “nature.” Communicology research is not limited to any
single domain.
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In other words, communicology in general and the proposed fourth step are in no way limited to
analyses that investigate explicitly body- or nature-related phenomena. Culture, language and discourse
all have embodied origins, and can themselves be viewed as living fabrics that exist with and through
unique forms of materiality. However, more communication-oriented research needs to be done
regarding how subtle substance or double substance thinking operates and emerges in non-western
cultures as well as covertly or subconsciously in Eurocentric ontology. Further, communicological
analyses specifically related to human conceptions of and interaction with “nature” potentially build
paths toward a new discourse with capacity to influence related discourses. A broader, logic-based
understanding of the hidden realm of materiality—this fourth step called grounding—could reveal a
surprisingly practical entry into domain that has long been dismissed as non-quantifiable and therefore
irrelevant by positivist natural and social science methods. I take care with terms like “re-enchantment,”
or “soil of existence” when describing this realm, as the terms are marked to some degree as nonscientific. For this reason, Abram (1996) refers to such a realm with the term “ambiguity:”
The living world—this ambiguous realm that we experience in anger and joy, in grief and in
love—is both the soil in which all our sciences are rooted and the rich humus into which their
results ultimately return, whether as nutrients or as poisons. Our spontaneous experience of the
world, charged with subjective, emotional, and intuitive content, remains the vital and dark
ground of all our objectivity (p. 34).
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Part III. Course Syllabus
15. Syllabus for a General Introductory Communicology Course
Communicology is not generally offered as part of university Communication Studies curricula.
Many leading scholars acknowledge that Communicology, with its research method of semiotic
phenomenology, is difficult to learn as well as to teach. Communicology is still a young discipline,
skirting the edges of the academic mainstream. It also involves a number of rather complex
philosophical concepts. Issues like these tend to turn away students and scholars alike. This thesis serves
as my argument for including Communicology in mainstream academics as well as in the public.
The theoretical section of this thesis approaches Lanigan’s condensed summary/definition as a
starting point to explore the question: “what is communicology?” Throughout my theoretical analysis, I
have attempted to open up the definition in such a way that an instructor might find multiple access
points to help students connect and engage with the material in a way that both inspires and makes
logical sense.
The following course syllabus offers an example of how Lanigan’s definition can be expanded
and explored over the course of an entire university term. The definition serves as an anchor for
students, preventing the philosophical boundaries of the discipline from blurring into infinity. The course
schedule aligns with subheads explored throughout the theoretical analysis, culminating in an
opportunity to discuss and explore a fourth realm for theory and research. Any instructor should remain
current with Lanigan’s work, incorporating new concepts and ideas into the syllabus as necessary—
especially the section addressing a fourth research concept.
The theoretical analysis within this thesis explores the power and potentiality of communicology
to address serious socio-cultural problems, while the syllabus offers readings with examples of how
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scholars are using the discipline of communicology in the field today. Readings should be reviewed and
updated regularly.
As a student myself, I struggled to understand the boundaries and purpose of communicology.
Much brilliant work exists in and about the discipline, though I found no straightforward or accessible
paths for the newcomer. I hope the following syllabus provides a useful tool for organizing and
presenting the discipline of communicology in a sensible format, for balancing theoretical learning with
practical application, and for transferring a sense of fascination regarding the possibilities associated
with semiotic phenomenology as both theory and praxis.

SYLLABUS
Time & Place:
Instructor:
Office Location:
Phone Number:
E-mail Address:
Office hours:

Why study Communicology?
The study of Communicology examines how meaning in our lives emerges through communicative
practices involving ourselves, other people, and the world around us. It considers how all inquiry—all
science and research—emerges from not only our lived experience of the world, but also the way
language and communication interconnect with that experience. Communicology offers a criticalinterpretive approach to addressing serious social and cultural problems, helping students interrupt the
“natural attitude” toward communication, and developing skills for initiating deep reorganization and
change.
Course Objectives
Students who complete this class will:
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differentiate between Communicology and Communication Studies.
understand a general history of the development of the field of Communicology.
analyze the ways that culture is constructed through communication and vice versa.
explain how Communicology can be applied to understand and address problems.
provide an informed and thought-provoking answer to the question: “Why study
communication?”

Text Books
Readings as assigned.
Approach
Given that communicology is the study of embodied human discourse and communication, this class will
be conducted primarily through large- and small-group discussion. Each student will be part of a working
group. Working groups will be responsible for answering questions and leading fellow classmates
through discussions about assigned readings. Students will complete written exercises to help them
understand and apply concepts. Students will take several exams to assess understanding and concept
mastery.
Assignments and Grading
Concept Summary 10 @ 10 each
Prepared Questions 10 @ 10 each
Learning Group Panels 5 @ 15 each
Tests 2 @ 75 each
Group Project Report
Final Project Paper
Final Examination
Total Points Available

100 points
100 points
75 points
150 points
40 points
55 points
80 points
575 points

Assignments
Prepared Questions: Each student must prepare three questions regarding each assigned reading.
Students will bring questions to class, use questions as a guide during learning group and other class
discussion. Students must turn in questions before leaving class in order to receive credit.
Concept Summary: At the end of every class, you will write down the key concepts and ideas that we
will have identified together. Each summary will be collected and graded as a demonstration of your
attendance and participation in class. The summary sheets will be used as a basis for the tests. You will
turn this in at the end of class and will receive it back at the beginning of next class.
Learning Groups: A learning group is composed of 3-5 students who meet during (and optionally outside
of) class to promote mutual understanding of reading topics and share this understanding during
presentation regarding assigned topics in class.
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During class time, student groups will (a) meet to discuss material; (b) present an overview of
the selected material to the class; and (c) lead a class discussion to elaborate, explain and
expand upon the material presented in the readings, fielding questions prepared by classmates
as well as the instructor.
Every group member must read all of the assigned material and should be prepared to answer
questions regarding all readings. Do not divide the reading up among your group’s members.
Students and instructor may direct questions to specific group members.
Questions should be of three kinds: 1. Recall of information from the reading, 2. Questions that
provoke discussion of concepts, and 3. Questions that link the present reading to other or
previous course readings.
Students in groups will be graded on the basis of their informed, accurate, well-articulated
responses to questions. It is the group’s responsibility to make sure that all members are given
an equal opportunity to respond to questions, and to avoid situations where a single member or
two of your group dominates the discussion.
Students in the audience will also be graded on participation as well as quality of prepared
typed questions.

Applied Semiotic Phenomenology exercise: Life Story Interviews
Students will work together to select a broad discourse topic for experience-based life-stories. Each
group will narrow that down to a focused sub-topic. Each student will select and share a life story that
relates to the topic in some direct way. Individual groups will function as small research teams. Each
student will provide a written description of their own selected life story to each group member (max 2
pages, double spaced), making an effort to resist explanation. The student will also tell (impromptu,
without reading what they have written) their selected life story to the small group. Each group member
will treat this as an interview opportunity, asking questions, taking notes and sharing written summaries
of those notes with all group members.
For example, “lived experience of being a university student” might be a general topic, and narrow
topics might include:







Pressure
Boredom
Fascination
Alienation
The Classroom
The Future

Employing the research framework learned in class, each student will prepare a Group Project Report
identifying (1) clearly defined research steps (description, reduction, interpretation); (2) capta, data and
acta; (3) phenomenology, semiotic and an instance of semiosis. Goals include: (a) reveal specific
meaning or understanding that was initially hidden within the discourse; (b) demonstrate limits of the
natural attitude.
Note: if this structure causes any IRB-related conflict, instructor will supply material for use with this
assignment.
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Final Project Paper: Students will prepare a final research paper using the communicology research
methodology to perform an analysis of a topic of their choice. This could include research material
generated in class, an individual life experience, an interview(s) or other topic.
Tests: Students will take 2 tests based on the readings, class discussions, and group presentations.
Concept summaries will serve as study guides.
Final examination: The final examination is comprehensive and will include mostly short and essay
questions. Concept summaries will serve as study guides.

Class Schedule

Module 1. Introduction and Overview: Communicology & the Science of Human Communication







Introductions & Syllabus
Assign student working groups
o Working groups meet and assign group roles.
Essential terms and concepts (philosophy; ontology; epistemology, rhetoric, Communicology)
o Groups receive terms to research and present to class
Introduce Richard Lanigan and discuss Lanigan’s Communicology definition.
Introduce Ruesch & Bateson’s four network levels of Communication.
Class question/discussion: What is Communicology? Why study communication?

Reading 1: Communicology: What’s in a Name? (Catt, Klyukanov & Smith)
Reading 2: History, Time and Context (Martinez Ch. 3)
[DATE] ASSIGNMENTS DUE:




Concept Summary
3 typed questions for each individual assigned reading
Group-led discussion of readings

Module 2: Discourse, Culture, Embodiment and Consciousness in Communication




What is discourse, and how is it “embodied?”
o In-class exercises regarding communication and the generation of meaning
Embodiment and Consciousness
What is culture?
o How are discourse and culture related to one another?
o How does culture influence communication and vice versa?
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Reading 3: On Homeworld and Community Models of the City: The Communicology of Egocentric and
Sociocentric Cultures in Urban Semiotics (2011) Richard L. Lanigan
Reading 4: Culture in the Context of Communicology, by Klyukanov, I., in Communicology: The New
Science of Embodied Discourse
Reading 5: The Wonder of Culture, in Communication Theory Through the Ages (2018). Klyukanov, I &
Sinekopova, G.

[DATE] ASSIGNMENTS DUE:




Concept Summary
3 typed questions for each reading
Group-led discussion of readings

Module 3. Logic in Communicology and the Human Sciences








Differentiating between Communicology and Communication Studies; Natural Sciences and
Human Sciences
 Shannon and Weaver Information Theory Model
 Jakobson Discourse/Communicology model
What is logic?
Exploring the four logics
Lanigan on Q.E.D v. Q.E.I.
 Why does this matter?
How do the four logics operate in natural sciences v. human sciences?
Discuss science from the perspective of Bruno Latour and Thomas Kuhn.
 Two brief interviews with Latour regarding scientific inquiry
 General outline of Kuhn’s structure

Reading 6: The Monstrosity of Adduction (2018). Klyukanov, I.
Reading 7: Applied communicology in organization PR and R&D: Peirce on synechism, Fuller on
synergetics, Gordon on synectics, and Alinsky on socialism (2020) Lanigan, R.L.
Reading 8: Human Communication, in Phenomenology of Communication (1988). Lanigan, R.L.
Reading 9: TBD current work in the field
[DATE] ASSIGNMENTS DUE:




Concept Summary
3 typed questions for each reading
Group-led discussion of readings
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Module 4. Semiotics and Semiology


Semiotics: de Saussure and Peirce
o Structuralism & post-structuralism
o Peirce’s triadic framework

Reading 9: Semiotics in Communicology, in Communicative Sexualities. (2011). Martinez, J.
Reading 10: The Photographic Message (Barthes)
Reading 11: What is a sign? (C.S. Peirce)
Optional other: Signs of Sacred Play: Musings on the Semiotics of Rainbows (Eicher-Catt)

[DATE] ASSIGNMENTS DUE:





Test 1
Concept Summary
3 typed questions for each reading
Group-led discussion of readings

Module 5. Phenomenology



Continental Philosophy and Existential Phenomenology – what are they and what do they have
to do with Communicology?
Phenomenology:
 Edmund Husserl
 Martin Heidegger’s Dasein
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Reading 12: Philosophy on the Way to Ecology: A Technical Introduction to the Inquiry (Abram)
Reading: Phenomenology in Communicology, in Communicative Sexualities. (2011). Martinez, J.
Reading 14: Preface to Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, translation: Landes
(2014)

[DATE] ASSIGNMENTS DUE:




Concept summary due
3 typed questions for each reading
Group-led discussion of readings
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Module 6. Semiotic-Phenomenology—Theory


The interface between these two seemingly opposed communication theories.
o Peirce’s phaneroscopy (phenomenology) in conjunction with Peirce’s semiotic—an
interplay.
o Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology in conjunction with Merleau-Ponty's parole
parlante/parole parlée (semiotic)--an interplay.

Reading: Semiotic Phenomenology, in Communicative Sexualities. (2011). Martinez, J.
Reading: The Foundations of Semiotic Phenomenology, in Phenomenology of Communication (1988).
Lanigan, R.L.
Reading: TBD: Current work related to the discipline

[DATE] ASSIGNMENTS DUE:




Concept summary
3 typed questions for each reading
Group-led discussion of readings

Module 7. Semiotic Phenomenology—Research Paradigm & Methodology





Semiotic Phenomenology as a Research Methodology
o Lanigan’s research Steps and their functions
Possibility of a fourth step.
o Discuss Lanigan’s allusions to fourth research step and explore ideas/possibilities
Incorporating non-western knowledges.
Select topics for Group Project
o Discuss problematizing an issue

Reading 15: Epistemology and ethics in human science research. (2012) Smith, Andrew R.
[DATE] ASSIGNMENTS DUE:




Concept Summary 6 due
3 typed questions for each reading
Group-led discussion of readings

Module 8. Semiotic Phenomenology Applied





Life Story Project begins
Lecture on research praxis and review of readings
Examples of contemporary applications of communicology in the field
Groups conduct research interviews.
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Reading 16: Delegitimizing Violence: Resistance as Communicative Practice in Authoritarian Regimes
(Andrew R. Smith)
Reading 17: Advancing Family Communication Scholarship (Eicher-Catt)
[DATE] ASSIGNMENTS DUE:





Life story (max 2 typed pages double spaced)
Concept Summary
3 typed questions for each reading
Group-led discussion of readings

Module 9. Synthesis, Collaborations and Research Applications




Interdisciplinary applications and manifestations
The future of communicology: capacity and potential
How does communicology augment or work alongside other methods?

Reading 19: TBD - Current work related to the discipline
Reading 20: TBD - Current work related to the discipline

[DATE] ASSIGNMENTS DUE:





Group Project Report
Concept Summary
3 typed questions for each reading
Group-led discussion of readings

Module 10. Final Week
[DATE] ASSIGNMENTS DUE:



Final Project Paper due
Final Exam
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